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ABSTRACT 
The potential and limits of the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS):  Land Reform 
implementation in Gauteng Province of South Africa 
 
Land reform in South Africa emerged as one of the important policies for reconciliation, 
reconstruction and development of the country after years of racial segregation. Its 
implementation has been three-fold i.e. land restitution, redistribution and tenure reform. The 
initial sub-programmes of land redistribution i.e. Settlement Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) and 
Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) have been confronted with numerous 
challenges and they have been criticised for influencing group owned projects due to their grant 
funding models. SLAG required beneficiaries to qualify as households and its failure to date has 
been largely attributed to unresolved conflicts amongst group members. Under LRAD, although 
beneficiaries qualified as individuals, the number of grants continued to be challenged by the 
increasing land prices, and as a result, group-owned projects continued to be created to match the 
land prices. Both models were demand-driven under the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ principle. 
In 2006, government introduced a new model called the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy 
(PLAS) which is a ‘supply-driven’ model but operating within the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ 
principle. The structural changes introduced in 2010 placed PLAS as the sole land acquisition 
model under land redistribution. This research investigates the manner in which the 
implementation of this model assisted to resolve the gaps identified in its predecessors and the 
reasons thereof. Additionally, the research also investigates characteristics which persisted 
throughout and why such features persisted. The policy shift from a ‘demand-driven’ to a 
‘supply-driven’ model has brought changes in terms of planning, implementation and resource 
mobilization.  To achieve this, the researcher identified three cases where indepth research was 
conducted, and interviewed key roles placers from the national and provincial departments, and 
the local municipality. A questionnaire and semi-structures interviews were used to collect the 
data.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background   
 
Colonialism and apartheid combined, created in South Africa a bipolar distribution of land, 
wealth, and access to economic opportunities. In its history of conquest, dispossession, forced 
removals and racially skewed distribution of land and resources, it left its citizens with a 
complex and difficult legacy to reverse. As noted in the White Paper on South African Land 
Policy, this legacy is profound and is manifested at multiple levels, i.e. injustices stemming from 
racially based land dispossession, inadequate distribution of land ownership, dual land tenure 
systems, haphazard land development, and acute poverty (DLA, 1997). In addressing these racial 
imbalances, the post-apartheid government led by the African National Congress (ANC) put in 
place a legislative framework aimed at socio-economic improvement and development through 
Local Economic Development (LED) policies (Binns and Nel, 2002). According to Gilfillan 
(2001) land is an important economic resource for the development of rural livelihoods.   
 
In South Africa, control of land was the backbone of apartheid. The most notorious Act, the 
Black Land Act of 1913, placed vast areas of South Africa under the sole control of whites, 
while blacks were allocated traditional areas. This was followed by the Black Trust and Land Act 
of 1936 which allocated 13% of South Africa to black people who constituted the majority of the 
population (De Villiers, 1999). In 1994, when the first democratic government was elected, 
whites owned about 71% of agricultural land (not including state land or other land in urban 
areas) despite being only 11% of the population (De Villiers, 1999).  
The SA democratic government, through the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) which later 
became the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) provides for access 
to land and security of tenure within the context of Section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa. Section 25 states that “No one may be deprived of property except in terms of 
the law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property” (RSA 
Constitution, 1996). Land reform participants acquire land for agricultural and housing purposes 
and in a few isolated cases land is acquired for industrial, mining or nature conservation.  
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Land reform in South Africa is implemented in terms of three focused areas, namely restitution, 
tenure reform, and redistribution. The purpose of restitution is to restore land and provide other 
remedies to people dispossessed by racially discriminatory legislation and practice; land tenure 
reform is a rights based approach focusing on those who own and use the land and it refers to 
terms and conditions of lease hold, communal ownership and any type of land holding that is 
insecure; land redistribution focuses on providing the poor with land for residential and 
productive purposes in order to improve their livelihoods.  
Land redistribution initiatives such as the Settlement Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) and Land 
Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) have been confronted with numerous 
challenges and they are criticized for generating group-based  projects due to their grant funding 
models (Lahiff, 2007a). Both of them were envisaged to be ‘demand driven’, rather than ‘supply-
led’. SLAG required beneficiaries to qualify as households and its failure to date has been largely 
attributed to unresolved conflicts amongst group members (MALA, 2003). With LRAD, 
although beneficiaries qualified as individuals, the number of grants continued to be challenged 
by the increasing land prices, and as a result, group owned projects continued to be created to 
match the land prices (MALA, 2005:4). In 2006 the Department of Land Affairs introduced a 
new land reform management model called the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS). As 
indicated by MALA (2005:3), to ensure that land and agrarian reform moves to the new 
trajectory that will contribute to the higher path of growth, employment and equity by 2014, the 
introduction of proactive land acquisition by the state for targeted groups in the land market will 
resolve challenges faced by the PLAS predecessors, i.e. SLAG and LRAD. 
 
As stated in the strategy framework, the objectives of PLAS include: to accelerate the land 
redistribution process; to ensure that the DLA can acquire land in the nodal areas and in the 
identified agricultural corridors and other areas of high agricultural potential to meet the 
objectives of Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA); to improve 
the identification and selection of beneficiaries and the planning of land on which people would 
be settled; and to ensure maximum productive use of land acquired (DLA, 2006a). PLAS deals 
with two approaches i.e. a needs-based approach and a supply-led approach but essentially 
focuses on the state as the lead driver in land redistribution rather than beneficiary-driven 
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redistribution. The needs-based approach is such that land acquisition will be determined by the 
existing needs of the people, yet the supply-led approach projects government as the sole 
supplier of land in response to identified needs. By the end of 2009, Gauteng Province had 
instigated 99 PLAS projects which are leased to individuals, families and groups. The objective 
of this research is to investigate the significance of the strategy and to determine how it has 
reconciled the challenges experienced by its predecessors, i.e. SLAG and LRAD.  
 
1.2. Research problem and hypothesis  
 
The introduction of PLAS brought a new understanding of land ownership and management in 
land reform. SLAG was designed for multiple land use purposes whereas LRAD was exclusively 
for agricultural purposes. Beneficiaries of the strategy are required to service their lease 
agreement through payment of an annual lease to the value of 6% of the purchase price, and this 
is an indication that beneficiaries are settled for production purposes. However, some 
characteristics of land use management observed in SLAG and LRAD are recurring as PLAS 
continue to be implemented. These include group formations for the management of leased 
properties. As a hypothesis, it is envisaged that the recurrence of certain weaknesses observed in 
the past models, are a result of socio-economic factors, institutional practices and political 
influences. Group projects remain typical within the PLAS, producing similar outcomes to those 
it was intended to remedy. 
 
1.3. Research questions  
 
1.3.1. Primary research question:  
 
The question is: To what degree is PLAS realizing its own objectives and in what ways does it 
avoid or replicate limitations of its predecessors, and why?  
1.3.2. Secondary research questions:  
 
a) Why are group projects persistent even on the PLAS model which is not grant based?  
b) To what extent does the state intervene and support the operations and management of 
PLAS projects?  
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c) What types of types of projects are produced by PLAS as compared to its predecessors?  
d) What are the challenges facing land reform beneficiaries leasing state land acquired 
through PLAS?  
e) What are the similarities between PLAS and its redistribution predecessors?  
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CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODOLGY 
 
2.1. Study area  
 
2.1.1. Geographical location 
 
The study was conducted in Gauteng Province. Gauteng is the smallest province in the country in 
terms of geographical space, comprising 1.876 billion hectares (GDARD, 2007). The province is 
divided into three district municipalities (West Rand District Municipality, Metsweding District 
Municipality and Sedebeng District Municipality) and three metropolitan municipalities, i.e. 
Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality, Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality and Ekurhuleni 
Metropolitan Municipality.  
 
Gauteng Province has a population of approximately 9,1801 million people (representing an 
increase of more than 1.5m over the past five years). This represents about 19.22% of the 
national population. The population pyramid bulges in the male 20-40 age group mainly owing 
to the demographic profile of immigrants. Gauteng contributes 33.9% to the national Gross 
Domestic Product. According to the National Land Cover (NLC), about 17% of Gauteng’s land 
is classified as urban land while 97% of the population lives in urban areas. Only 15% of the 
land is considered developed (GDACE, 2006). 
 
Gauteng is generally considered to be an urban built-up province. The result of the recent zoning 
indicates that Gauteng is only 18% built-up although it is highly fragmented. Urban development 
in Gauteng is taking place at a fast pace, seriously challenging aspects of sustainable 
development, resulting in problems such as the loss of high potential agricultural land essential 
for viable agricultural practices (GDACE, 2007). 
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2.1.2. Agricultural development of the Province  
 
As indicated in the Gauteng Agricultural Development Strategy (GDACE, 2006) the total 
farmland in Gauteng is 828 623 ha (44.2% of total land area of province) of which 438 623ha 
(23.4%) is potentially arable (i.e. suitable for ploughing and planting) and 390 000 ha is suitable 
for grazing. The amount of potentially arable land that is currently being cultivated is 
approximately 293 571ha (67%). Approximately 28.7% of all arable land has been identified as 
potentially requiring specific protection for agricultural use, as it is made up of 15.1% high 
potential and 13.6% moderately-high potential land (GDARD, 2007). Gauteng agriculture is 
mainly focused on livestock (including piggeries), poultry, horticulture (including floriculture), 
and crop production (including the limited cultivation of herbs and medicinal crops).  
 
2.2. Research design  
 
Mouton, as cited by Fouche and de Vos (2002:137) defines research design as a plan or blue 
print of how a researcher intends conducting research. It is further indicated that a research 
design focuses on the end product, formulates a research problem as a point of departure and 
further focuses on the logic of research. Research can be conducted in a quantitative and/or a 
qualitative manner. Neuman, as cited by Fouche and de Vos (2002:138) distinguishes between 
quantitative and qualitative research designs.  
 
Quantitative research includes experiments, surveys and content analysis whereas qualitative 
research includes ethnography, biography, case studies, phenomenology and grounded theory. 
Qualitative research is aimed at gaining a deeper understanding of a specific organization or 
event, rather than surface descriptions of a large sample of a population. It aims to provide an 
explicit rendering of the structure, order, and broad patterns found among a group of participants. 
It is also called ethnomethodology or field research. It generates data about human groups in 
social settings.  However, de Vos (2002:367) is of the opinion that impact evaluation is largely 
qualitative and is most often performed as experiments.  
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2.3. Population and sampling  
 
Strydom and Venter (2002:198) define sampling as taking any portion of a population or 
universe as a representative of the population. Strydom and Venter (2002:209) further indicate 
that the term universe is referred to as all potential subjects who possess the attributes in which 
the researcher is interested in. In this study, the term population refers to all PLAS projects 
within Gauteng Province. The researcher considered projects where beneficiaries have been 
settled for a period of more than a year. The justification for this is due to the fact that 
beneficiaries have signed a three year lease contract which is subject to review before renewal, 
and secondly, the lease agreement compels lessee to be productive so that they can pay their 
rental.  
 
Seaberg, as cited by Strydom and Venter (2002:197) describes a sample as a small portion of the 
total set of objects, events or persons that together comprise the subjects of a study. The 
researcher used a non-probability method of sampling which is known as target sampling. The 
target sampling is defined as a powerful systematic method by which a controlled list of 
specified populations within a geographical district are developed and detailed plans are 
designed to recruit adequate numbers of cases within each target so that the sample would be 
representative. The researcher selected three projects which were used as case studies. However, 
an overview of the PLAS implementation in Gauteng Province covered the past and present 
experiences.  
 
The study was based primarily on qualitative research. An overview of how PLAS has been 
implemented in Gauteng Province is provided to outline the magnitude of the projects in the 
province in terms of hectares, beneficiaries, geographical dominance, purchase price, selection 
and allocation processes and legal entities. In addition, three projects were carefully selected 
based on the nature of their land use management, number of beneficiaries of the project and the 
overall performance of the project. The selection process allowed for covering diversity such as 
participants from projects owned by individuals, group members knowing each other, and group 
members who did not know one another.  
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The selected three projects were used as case studies. From the three projects, one individually- 
owned project was selected, one group-owned project was selected, and one group-owned 
project where only one individual is using the property, was chosen. The interviews were 
extended to key informants such as government officials in the DRDLR, GDARD, and 
Municipalities.  
 
2.4. Data collection 
 
Data was collected through a structured questionnaire, focus group discussion and individual 
interviews of beneficiaries and stakeholders. Focus groups consisted of 3-5 participants.  
 
The data included information on group formation, legal entities, decision making processes, 
land use and business management and operations. The intention of the questions was primarily 
focused on identifying old problems recurring, old problems being resolved and identification of 
new problems emerging as PLAS continue to be implemented. The questions included the 
process of acquiring land, what they are doing differently, additional processes and the outcome 
thereof. 
  
The researcher analyzed the overall implementation and trends of land reform delivery under 
redistribution. This analysis included a national comparison in terms of the provinces, 
redistribution category, annual delivery and beneficiaries. The analysis also drew comparisons 
between LRAD and PLAS and the related processes.  Three projects were then selected from the 
West Rand District Municipality and the Mogale City Local Municipality. These were sampled 
to provide the insight of the dynamics around the PLAS model. Mogale City Municipality was 
selected because of its vast contribution to producing PLAS projects in the West Rand District 
Municipality. 
 
The researcher used a questionnaire which was a basic tool for data collection. According to the 
New Dictionary of Social Work, cited by Delport (2002:172), a questionnaire is a set of 
questions on a form, which is administered by a researcher. This questionnaire can have open-
ended and/or closed questions. Delport (2002:173) describes various types of questionnaires such 
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as mailed questionnaires, telephonic questionnaires, personal questionnaires; questionnaires 
delivered by hand and group questionnaires. In this study the researcher used the personal 
questionnaire because it allows for further engagement with responses from the respondents. The 
respondents were limited to six (6) farmers from different projects and fifteen (15) land reform 
practitioners from the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, Gauteng Department 
of Agriculture and Rural Development and Mogale City Local Municipality. The researcher used 
semi-structured interviews that did not rely on any standard formats.  
 
The respondents were visited at the farms and questionnaires were administered there. In 
addition, data collection was extended through semi-structured interviews, to the stakeholders 
such as DRDLR, GDARD, Mogale City Local Municipality and other PLAS land reform 
beneficiaries. The researcher further analyzed departmental documents and project data such as 
application forms, valuations reports, business plans and feasibility studies, minutes of the 
meetings, and lease contracts. 
 
2.5. Data analysis   
 
The collected data was analyzed qualitatively in line with the aims and objectives of the study. 
The results of the questionnaire were analyzed in terms of the responses gathered from the 
respondents per project. The analysis included the land identification and acquisition processes, 
project institutional arrangements and beneficiary selection mechanisms, land use management 
and farm production, beneficiaries’ obligations, beneficiaries training and development, 
marketing and extension services.  
 
Secondly, the analysis was extended to documents such as departmental annual reports and 
interviews of key informants. The documents provided data which was analyzed with the 
intention of identifying the land delivery and beneficiation trends over the years, nationally and 
provincially. The key informants included role players such as officials of the national, 
provincial and local spheres of government. The interviews of these key informants were used to 
analyze the process flow, to track changes on programme transition over time and to record 
comparable experiences.  
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Thirdly, the data gathered from the focus group discussions assisted the researcher with the 
general interpretation of information provided by beneficiaries on land reform in general, but 
with a particular focus on the comparison between LRAD and PLAS.     
 
2.6. Ethics statement  
 
The researcher kept all data gathered confidential and for academic purposes as Babbie 
(2007:27) indicates that “the fundamental rule of social research is that it must bring no harm to 
research subjects”. The researcher negotiated access to projects as a researcher rather than as an 
employee of DRDLR. All data collected and analyzed from departmental documents were used 
solely for research purposes. All respondents were assured that all data collected and their views 
would not jeopardize their relationship with any of the stakeholders because it is for the purposes 
of academic research.  
 
The author is aware of the importance of privacy, anonymity, and confidentiality in interviews as 
suggested by Neuman (2003:126). The researcher also acknowledges the possibility of getting 
information which may presents DRDLR in a negative light, and such information will not be 
used for anything beyond this academic endeavor. It is assumed that the process of collecting 
data may create expectations from the respondents; however, the researcher will not convey the 
data to DRDLR.       
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1. Market Based Land Reform 
 
3.1.1. International perspective  
 
According to Lahiff (2007a:2) there is a general understanding amongst scholars that Market-
Based Land Reform (MBLR) has emerged as a reaction to the perceived weaknesses of state-led 
approaches to land and agrarian reform. This experience has drawn observations from countries 
like China, the Soviet bloc and their satellites in Africa, and Latin America where there were 
inefficiencies of state and collective farms. It is also based on the assertion that markets can 
bring efficiency and equity benefits through transferring land from less to more productive users 
i.e. from large to small.  
 
Van Zyl and Binswanger (1996:419) indicates that “this was key with the World Bank and 
others, and the change observed is related to the greater acknowledgement by neo-liberal 
economists that markets alone are unlikely to bring about the anticipated restructuring of 
property relations, due to a range of imperfections, including limited access to capital and 
information on the part of the vulnerable buyers as well as the tendency of land prices to exceed 
productive value.”  
 
In Zimbabwe, MBLR mechanisms were adopted as part of wider political and economic 
concessions made to white settlers during transition, with a particular goal to protect white 
property interests (Moyo, 1995 as cited by Lahiff, 2007a:5).  In this case, the concept of the 
‘willing seller, willing buyer’ has been identified as a constraint to government through granting 
land owners a veto on the reform process (Moyo, 1995 as cited by Lahiff, 2007a:5). 
Expropriation was then consented as the Constitution was amended in 1992 and land acquisition 
was passed, in cases where land was under-utilized. However, even in this arrangement, payment 
was required upfront (Moyo, 1995 as cited by Lahiff, 2007a:5). The 1992 Land Acquisition Act 
was enacted to speed up the land reform process by removing the "willing seller, willing buyer" 
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clause, limiting the size of farms and introducing a land tax (although the tax system was never 
implemented.). The Act empowered government to buy land compulsorily for redistribution, and 
a fair compensation was to be paid for land acquired.  
 
In countries such as Brazil and Philippines, MBLR evolved from longer running processes of 
non-market based land reform. This market-assisted land reform became the dominant model in 
some of these countries, not because of its inherent merits, but due to the conditionality or 
political pressure and the increasing political costs of state intervention (Hall, 2008:9).  
 
3.1.2. Need for land reform in South Africa 
 
Land questions have shaped the history of South Africa to a point that its solution is critically 
important for stability, democracy and development (Anseeuw and Mathebula, 2008). 
Historically, dispossession by white settlers of the land occupied by indigenous black societies 
was centrally important in creating a racially polarized and highly unequal society since the 17th 
century. This legacy was continued by the apartheid government which relocated millions of 
black people, in both urban and rural areas, attempting to create separate racial zones and 
ethnically-defined ‘homelands’. As indicated by Cousins (2009) productive land was lost and the 
small-scale farming that helped rural households to survive was undermined, hence white 
commercial farmers were given massive financial support and subsidies, and over time they 
became highly productive. 
 
Land reform intends to redress the imbalances created by the past regimes. Land therefore carries 
a powerful political charge (McMillan et al., 1992). It was for this reason, too, that 
‘reconciliation’ was seen in 1994 as one of the important motivations for resolving the land 
question. Secondly, it is believed that redistribution of farmland, together with other rural 
development programmes, can make a significant contribution to poverty reduction. This is why 
it is one of the five key focus points in the ANC 2009 election manifesto. Around 40% of the 
population is located in rural areas, and this is where the deepest poverty is found, so there is 
some justification for this view (Cousins, 2009). 
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Lahiff (2008:32) states that “since 1994, land reform in South Africa has attempted to achieve 
many things, among them a more equitable pattern of landholding, the alleviation of rural 
poverty through the creation of opportunities for employment (including self-employment), the 
economic development of rural areas and reparations (both symbolic and material) for historical 
injustices.”  
 
3.1.3. Market-based Land Reform in South Africa 
 
As indicated by Lahiff (2005) the debate around land reform in South Africa has been based on 
the concept of the ‘willing seller, willing buyer.’ The World Bank influence in South Africa 
resulted in the setting of targets for the entire land reform programme, i.e. redistribution, 
restitution and tenure reform, was aiming to redistribute 30% of white owned agricultural land 
within a five year period. Hall (2008: 6) argued that the market assisted land reform, as promoted 
by the World Bank, had made little progress where only 1% of the targeted 30% of white owned 
agricultural land had been distributed by 1999 and only 4% by 2008. The constant postponement 
of the target date proves the inefficiencies of the strategies employed. In the third term of ANC 
governance, there is a general acknowledgement that the 30% target is not feasible within 2014 
which is the targeted period (DRDLR, 2010b). The issue of targeting land transfer percentages 
by a particular period has since been put under the carpet by the current administration.   
 
3.1.4. Land market for land reform   
 
In South Africa, it is evident that there is an active market for property transaction including 
farming land. However, Lahiff (2007a: 9) argues that there are reasons to believe that much of 
the land being transacted is not available for land reform. Aliber and Mokoena (2002) recorded 
that there are accusations of collusion among land owners who are opposed to land reform. Good 
quality land that comes onto the open markets is mostly sold through public auctions and private 
contracts. As a result, this limits the participation of the intended beneficiaries in the process. 
This could be by default from the government side, because there are limited provisions to 
explore this kind of market, because land reform systems do not have provisions for land 
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purchase through auctions. Furthermore, the bureaucratic approval processes required by 
government on land reform transaction cannot compete with the duration at private market 
conclude its transactions.   
 
The delay in government transaction is also a contributing factor in the choice of market. As 
indicated by Lahiff (2007a:9) the approval process requires a written agreement to sell from the 
land owner, and the asking price will have to be confirmed as ‘market related’ by an independent 
valuer appointed by the state. The applicants of land reform cannot participate in auctions, nor 
shop around, nor confirm the purchase within a usual time frame and so are excluded from the 
great majority of sales on what continues to be a highly competitive land market.  
 
The limited grant sizes, coupled with limited budgets, long and restrictive approval processes 
and land owner bias are combined to ensure that the intended beneficiaries of land reform are 
restricted to smaller proportions of land which are available on the market. These results in 
beneficiaries acquiring poor quality land and which is more expensive than they would wish for 
(Lahiff, 2007a:9).  
 
3.1.5. Market prices for land 
 
As indicated by Lahiff (2007a:10), in South Africa the payment of market prices has been central 
to MBLR. However, the payment of market prices has been vigorously opposed by organizations 
representing landless people, as discussed at the National Land summit in 2005 (DLA, 2005). 
The acknowledgement of the challenge by landowners suggests that there may be some 
acceptance of non-market measures, even expropriation, to acquire land, but not of compensation 
at below market rates (Lahiff, 2007a:11).  
 
The prices which are paid for land reform farms are normally set by the professional private 
valuers appointed by the state, and they establish their own market prices considering factors 
such as the recent sales of comparable properties in the area. In cases where the valued price falls 
below the asking price of the landowner, the state enters into negotiations with the land owner. In 
the process, landowners are at liberty to accept or reject the offered price, and the beneficiaries 
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are normally excluded from this process. Considering the reported cases of deals falling through 
due to differences between the asking price and the amount offered by the state, Tilley (2004) 
attributes this to the inadequacy of negotiation skills within the DLA.    
 
Aliber and Mokoena (2002:27) argue that MBLR in South Africa places land owners in an 
advantageous negotiation position because the limited number of properties is offered for land 
reform purposes. Applicants also often have strong preferences for a particular property. 
Furthermore, the additional cost incurred by the status before and during negotiations would be 
repeated, should the negotiations fail. As noted by Tilley (2004:39), the DLA process was too 
slow. There is a general reluctance of landowners to make their land available for land reform 
citing that the department does not seem to keep up with the pace of land transactions and the 
sellers get frustrated (Tilley, 2004:40). The bureaucratic process of approving a project has 
added a strain on the land market. This situation creates conflict between the political target 
which was to redistribute 30% of white owned agricultural land by 2014, versus government 
processes of assets and property acquisitions.  
 
In terms of government, there are processes such as price confirmation of the property, business 
feasibility, and beneficiary’s contributions, which are requirements towards the purchase of the 
land. Services such as valuations, business plans and feasibility studies, formations of legal 
entities, are in most cases outsourced using processes which are not conditioned to speed up the 
process. In addition, there are approval structures from the district level to the provincial levels, 
which equally contribute to the delay of the transaction. The meetings of such structures are 
scheduled at a minimum interval of a month, which means that if a next project phase is 
dependent on the results of the adjudication, it would have to wait for the committee 
adjudication.  
 
3.1.6. Budget for land reform 
 
As indicated by Hall and Lahiff (2004:1) the principal budget for land reform comes from the 
funds allocated to the DLA, and this covers the operating costs of DLA and the Commission on 
the Restitution of Land Rights, as well as the capital budget for land acquisition. Support for land 
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reform also comes from other government departments, notably the national and provincial 
departments of agriculture, district and local municipalities, and the state agencies such as the 
Land Bank, the National Development Agency, etc.   
 
There has been a considerable shift of budget allocations between Restitution and Land Reform. 
In the early years of the programme, land reform was the better resourced, but the demand for 
land restitution, coupled with redistribution under expenditure has resulted in the shift of focus 
towards restitution.     
 
The growth of the budget for land reform has been steady but slow, despite clear indications that 
a dramatic increase is needed to meet government’s official target of redistributing 30% of white 
owned agricultural land by 2014. The introduction of the Agricultural Land Holding Account 
brought significant changes in the budget of land redistribution. This is a sub-programme 
responsible for buying and holding land until suitable beneficiaries are identified in terms of the 
Provision of Land and Assistance Act (1993). The sub-programme had an allocation of R2.1 
billion which was used for land purchase (National Treasury, 2012:19). This is in addition to the 
R698.3 million budget allocated for land reform grants which is meant for programme and 
project planning, land acquisition and settlement, and allows the department to maintain, plan, 
develop and improve property. For 2013/14, the land redistribution programme is allocated R2.7 
billion which will be split between recapitalization of 552 farms and the acquisition of 170 000 
hectares of land (DRDLR, 2013).   
 
3.1.7. Beneficiary identification and selection 
 
Hall (2010b:65) argues that categories of targeted groups such as ‘marginalized groups’ of 
women, farm workers, the disabled and the youth are just a proxy of the ‘poor’. These groups 
might get preference in the evaluation processes, but there is no strategy to pursue and prioritize 
them. The current MBLR is designed in such a way that beneficiaries ‘self-select’ themselves, 
rather than by state-led processes. This process is likely to ensure that people with less interest in 
land reform are excluded from the process. However, this does not guarantee that those in most 
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need of land manage to access the programme or that those who apply to the programme acquire 
the land they want (Lahiff, 2007b:13). 
 
As indicated by Hall (2008:18), “the notion of ‘self-selection’ by beneficiaries as defining 
demand led cornerstone MBLR has been criticized, citing that the only expression of demand 
recognized by the state was the submission of land grant applications, and those who succeeded 
in getting that far were those with assets, education, transport, political networks, and ready cash 
with which to pursue their applications for state assistance.” The self-selection practice is 
common in redistribution from SLAG through LRAD to PLAS. In all these redistribution 
programmes, beneficiaries selected themselves, based on their own dynamics without 
compulsion from the state.    
 
3.2. Land Reform in South Africa   
 
The land reform policies of South Africa’s first non-racial democratic government began with 
the Constitution and the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The RDP 
document became the election manifesto of the African National Congress (ANC) in the 1994 
elections. This document was heavily influenced by the compromises that were negotiated in 
order to facilitate the relatively peaceful change of regime in South Africa, which was in 
transition from apartheid to democracy. It is evident that demands that have been part of the 
politics of liberation movements, such as the call of the 1955 Freedom Charter that “the land 
shall belong to those who work it”, were given expression in the RDP (ANC, 1955).   
 
The 1997 White Paper on the South African Land Policy sets out a wide range of objectives 
ranging from dealing with racially-based land dispossession, promoting economic growth and 
providing tenure security for all (DLA, 1997). This programme had a vision which sought to 
contribute to reconciliation, stability, growth and development in an equitable and sustainable 
way (DLA, 1997). This programme comprises the redistribution, tenure reform and restitution 
programmes, as stipulated by sub-sections 25(5), 25(6) and 25(7) of the Constitution respectively 
(RSA, 1996). 
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3.2.1. Land Restitution  
 
Sections 121-123 of the Interim Constitution of South Africa gave birth to the enactment of the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act (Act 22 of 1994). The objective of this act was to provide for the 
restitution of rights in land to persons or communities dispossessed of such rights after 19 June 
1913 as a result of the past racially discriminatory laws or practices. This is the date that gave 
birth to the Native Land Act which resulted in blacks losing their status of owning land.  
 
The restitution of land rights is a political process where communities who were dispossessed 
through apartheid legislation and policies, could submit claims for the restoration of their lost 
land (DLA, 1997). The Land Restitution Act was introduced in South Africa with the focus on 
redressing past injustices created as a result of racially based legislation or practices. It is closely 
linked to the need for the redistribution of land and tenure reform, thereby forming an integral 
part of the broader land reform programme. It is aimed at contributing positively to the process 
of reconciliation, reconstruction and development. As indicated in the White Paper on South 
African Land Policy, the land restitution programme only considers those communities that can 
prove that they were forcibly removed after 19 June 1913 (DLA, 1997:23).  
 
According to Platzky and Walker (1985) it is estimated that more than 3.5 million people and 
their descendants have experienced racially based dispossession and forced removals during the 
years of segregation and apartheid. These removals were carried out in terms of the Native Land 
Act, Act 27 of 1913, the Native Trust and Land Act, Act 18 of 1936, the Group Areas Act, Act 
41 of 1950, and the Urban Areas Act, Act 21 of 1923. In addition, rural removals consisted of 
various categories, such as black spot removals, removal of labour tenants, removal from mission 
stations, removal based on forestry requirements and internal removals in the scheduled and 
released areas.  
 
Although the Land Restitution Act sets up a legal and administrative process, this process does 
not aim to meet any targets for the redistribution of land. Successful land claims can be settled 
with the return of land, provision of alternative land, payment of cash or another form of 
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compensation (DLA, 1997). It is noted that the majority of claims have been settled through 
financial compensation, not the return of land (Hall, 2004: 12). 
 
3.2.2. Land Tenure Reform  
 
The White Paper on the South African Land Policy views tenure reform as a complex process. 
“It involves interests in land and the form that these interests should take. In South Africa, tenure 
reform must address difficult problems created in the past. The solutions to these problems may 
entail new systems of landholding, land rights and forms of ownership, and may therefore have 
far-reaching implications” (DLA, 1997:60). 
 
Bradstock (2005:5) posits that until the 1990s it was government policy that black people should 
not own land. Land rights in the homelands and townships were permit-based or held in trust. In 
most cases land was registered as the property of government or the South African Development 
Trust. The result was that although households occupied the land for many years, they had no 
legal right on that land. This uncertainty was the cause of conflicts as land could be confiscated, 
redistributed or sold by others who claimed to own it. 
 
Setting the terms and conditions by which people can hold and gain access to land remains one 
of the most complex challenges and difficult tasks facing the South African government. The 
absence of legally recognised land tenure arrangements is the overriding factor that makes rural 
areas unattractive, especially for the local financial markets. For these reasons, significant 
attempts were made to remove all the restrictions on land which prohibited black South Africans 
from owning, leasing and gaining access to land. This includes a system of land holding rights 
which promote development in rural areas.             
 
The land tenure reform deals with the land rights of people in communal areas, farm workers and 
labour tenants. The communal system exists in large parts of South Africa and it provides free or 
cheap access to land to the poor. However, this system undermined the individual rights of the 
community. This is because land which had previously been jointly utilized by a group would be 
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converted into a small number of ‘full economic units’ and awarded to a minority, whilst the 
majority of the group lost access to land (DLA, 1997:25).   
 
Labour tenants are impoverished members of communities who exchange their labour for the use 
of land on white-owned farms. In many cases the labour tenants have lived on the land in 
question all their lives, as did their ancestors for several generations and who are buried there. 
They know no other way of life and having been denied education opportunities by the apartheid 
regimes, are unable to compete for opportunities.  
 
Farm workers and labour tenants are one of the most impoverished and isolated groups in South 
Africa and are the poorest group of people in the formal sector of the South African economy 
(Marcus, 1996:43).  In 1986, the average income of farm workers in South Africa was R104 per 
month (Segal, 1991:7), which had increased to R225 in 1992, and by 1996, almost three-quarters 
of farm workers still lived below the poverty line.  
 
The process of developing legislation to deal with tenure in communal areas dragged on for 
years with little progress; until the Communal Land Rights Bill was gazetted in August 2002 
(Government Gazette no. 23740).It was later re-gazetted in October 2003 (Government Gazette 
no. 25562). The Bill came in for heavy criticism from land activists and academics, but 
nevertheless it was passed by Parliament in February 2004. The Communal Land Rights Act 
(Act 11 of 2004) was signed into law by the President on 14 July 2004 (Claassens, 2003; Cousins 
and Claassens, 2003; Sparks, 2004). This Act was finally struck down in 2010 after numerous 
contests by communities resisting having their land administered by ‘traditional councils’ and 
claimed that it was unconstitutional. 
 
3.2.3. Land Redistribution 
 
The 1994 Agricultural Policy of the ANC credited the Land and Agricultural Policy Centre 
(LAPC) work and set as its primary objective “equitable access to and optimal use of agricultural 
resources” (ANC, 1994:2). Though both principles of equity and efficiency are in conflict with 
each other, they underpinned the World Bank’s proposals which shaped the policy proposals of 
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South Africa for more than a decade. Hall (2010a) indicates that “these competing and 
contradictory visions for the future of agriculture were refracted through policy processes which 
produced a White Paper on Agriculture in 1995” which aimed to bring small scale farmers into 
the mainstream. This also led to the development of the Agricultural Policy three years later 
(MALA, 1998).  
 
The cornerstone of the state’s agricultural strategy – the removal of state support and the 
regulation while aiming to ensure new entrants into the ‘mainstream’ of commercial agriculture - 
created conflicting policy objectives (Coetzee, 2003:227). Although the Land Policy aimed to 
establish “small farmers”, the Agricultural Policy envisaged that markets should determine the 
scale of production: “The regulatory framework for agriculture will be scale neutral and will 
facilitate participation in production and marketing by new entrants to farming” (RSA, 1995:7).  
 
One of the strongest arguments for redistributive land reform worldwide is that it creates an 
environment for growth in agricultural production which supports broader economic growth and 
has a positive impact on poverty reduction. Such arguments are supported by information 
showing that countries with more equitable distribution of land tend to have higher levels of 
economic growth, while high levels of land concentration are often associated with less efficient 
resource utilization (World Bank 2003). 
 
Posterman and Reidinger (1987) argued that there is an inverse farm size-efficiency relationship 
in which smaller farms, where the producer has a secure owner or owner-like relationship to the 
land, produce substantially better return per hectare and on investments than any other model of 
agricultural production. They also argue that such analysis of productivity probability hides the 
full extent of the advantage of the owner operator system as it is based on only the main crops 
and does not take into account the variety of other crops normally grown on small owner-
operated farms. 
 
Other reasons offered for the beneficial effects of redistributive land reform are the breaking 
control of labour by large landlords (Griffin et al., 2002), a better total factor productivity of 
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small farmers, the labour intensive nature of small farms, and the large contribution of 
agricultural growth to the non-farm rural sector (Wilson and Ramphele, 1989). A study by 
Mellor (1999) indicates that growth in agriculture also has a disproportionately positive impact 
on poverty levels in comparison with other sectors. Not only is agriculture a large employer, it is 
a large employer of the poor. Thus a relatively small increase in growth in agriculture will have a 
large positive impact on employment and incomes for the poor.  
 
However, an established long-term trend of declining employment in agriculture is revealed. 
According to data contained in the Survey, in 2001 there were 969 000 people employed in 
agriculture. However, by 2012 that figure had declined to 638 000. This is a loss of 331 000 jobs 
in the sector, or a decline of 34%. The data also showed that in 2001, 7.8% of South Africa’s 
workforce was employed in agriculture, which by 2012 had declined to just 4.7% (Lebone, 
2013:1). It was  therefore quite possible that this trend could be accelerated by the 50% 
minimum wage increase for farmworkers  announced by the Labour Minister and set to come 
into operation in March 2013. Should this be the case, it will be a setback for rural development 
efforts (Lebone, 2013:1). 
 
3.2.3.1. Settlement Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG)   
  
The first approach adopted by government for redistributive land reform was the Settlement 
Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) which targeted families with an income of less than R1 500 per 
month. The poor were clearly the target group and poverty alleviation was a main objective. In 
this system, cash grants of R16 000,00 per  household  were  allocated  to  previously  
disadvantaged individuals for  farm  land  purchases. The land was purchased mainly for 
settlement and agricultural production. The first four years of the land Redistribution Programme 
were incredibly slow. The National Land Committee estimated that at that rate, it would take 45 
years to distribute 15% of agricultural land and 125 years to redistribute 30% of agricultural land 
(NLC, 1995). 
 
The SLAG programme is presumed to have failed mainly because of disputes which emanated 
from overcrowded projects (Turner and Ibsen, 2000:15). The disputes were mainly 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
disagreements over access and benefits by beneficiaries. As indicated by (Coetzee and Jooste, 
2005) beneficiaries pulled funds together in order to be able to purchase unproductive land at 
high prices (Jacobs et al, 2003).   
 
A range of weaknesses in implementation and quality of the group projects created in SLAG 
were identified (DLA, 2000). This included the size of the grant which was inadequate to 
purchase land and therefore perpetuated larger groups for a farm unit, and the grant was minimal 
to finance the required production inputs.  In 2000, the government issued a policy statement 
confirming the weaknesses of the SLAG approach. These included its failure to realize land 
reform objectives, the reliance on market forces for redistribution, failing to produce the desired 
results, and the SLAG grants being unsuitable for the creation of a group of black commercial 
farmers (DLA, 2000). The results of SLAG were chaotic, with groups displaying conflicting 
objectives. The policy statement outlined the new approach to redistribution and was followed 
shortly thereafter by the release of the first draft of the Land Redistribution for Agricultural 
Development (LRAD) programme, which was to become the primary mechanism for land 
redistribution by 2014. The first draft was rather different from the initial ones. Initially it was 
only for ‘qualified’ farmers and own contribution was to be in cash or kind, not labour i.e. it was 
payable by everyone.  
 
Farm workers also qualified to apply for the R16 000 per household grant to finance or partially 
finance the purchase of equity shares in farms. Few farm workers benefitted from the scheme; 
there is no reliable data to assess how successful this scheme has been.  
 
In 1997 the DLA adopted a Municipal Commonage Programme. The intention was to 
“encourage local authorities to develop the conditions that will enable poor residents to access 
existing commonage, currently used for other purposes. Further, the Department will provide 
funds to enable resource-poor municipalities to acquire additional land for this purpose” (DLA, 
1997:50). Though Municipal Commonage had the greatest transfers by 2003, its emphasis was 
minimised after the ministerial review process of land reform in 2000 (Anderson and Pienaar, 
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2003:1). This model has not been fully explored, and its implementation had been overshadowed  
by dual implementation of different redistribution models.  
3.2.3.2. Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD)  
  
The three sub-programmes of land redistribution were finalised in the LRAD plan. This includes 
“Agricultural Development - to make land available to people for agricultural purposes, 
Settlement – to provide people with land for settlement purposes [and] Non-agricultural 
enterprises – to provide people with land for non-agricultural enterprises, for example 
ecotourism projects” (DLA, 2001:1). LRAD replaced the former Settlement Land Acquisition 
Grant scheme (SLAG) in 2001. SLAG can be considered a tool for assisting the poor (families 
with a monthly income of less than R1500) with land purchase by granting the amount of R16 
000 per household (DLA, 1997).  
 
The intention of SLAG was to uplift the status of the very poor and to reduce poverty amongst 
the targeted group of beneficiaries (Wegerif, 2004:11). Besides individuals, groups or entire 
communities were able to qualify for the grant as well. By working together, communities could 
qualify for a substantial sum towards acquiring land (De Villiers, 2003:50). However, a review 
of the SLAG policies by the DLA between 1998 and 1999 revealed several weaknesses within 
the implementation process as well as regarding the quality of the group projects SLAG had 
created (Wegerif, 2004:11). 
 
In contrast to SLAG, LRAD was designed to be more market-friendly and in toto closer to the 
original approach whose design was influenced by the World Bank, which consulted the DLA in 
the developing process (Wegerif, 2004:11). The LRAD  programme  was  expected  to  enhance 
"commercial"  agricultural  production  for  the  market  rather  than  subsistence  production 
(Andrew et al, 2003). LRAD differed from SLAG in that beneficiaries do not have to be poor to 
qualify for a grant. The grant was a minimum  of R20 000 which was increased to R111 000 in 
2006,  and  beneficiaries who  had more  savings  and who  could  raise  bigger loans  to  finance  
their  farms,  also  qualified  for  larger  grants.  Beneficiaries could add equity and debt capital 
totalling at least R400 000 (which later increased to R500 000) to qualify for a maximum grant 
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of R100 000 (which was later increased to R430 000). This approach symbolized a significant 
shift in the South African government’s land redistribution policy, which takes a different path 
from poverty alleviation and group settlement, but supports settling prospective commercial 
farmers on their own farms. In its first year, LRAD redistributed approximately one million 
hectares of farmland in South Africa (Lyne and Darroch, 2004).  
 
The common factor between SLAG and LRAD is that they are “willing buyer-willing seller” 
driven, which means that the availability of land on the market depends on the willingness of the 
owner and/ or the seller, unlike restitution where land is claimed by the dispossessed. The 
“willing buyer-willing seller” strategy received criticism as it has achieved minimum  success  
and  it  was  one  of  the  core  issues  addressed  in  the  2005  Land  Summit. Redistributive land 
reform was highly criticized for its slow progress and much of that was attributed to the lack of 
willingness to sell by white land owners who were criticized for inflating land prices where 
government was involved in purchasing (DLA, 2005). In addition, it was also  raised  that 
although  land  became  available  in  the market  on  a  “willing  buyer-willing  seller”  basis,  
the  land  in  question  in  most  instances  did  not correspond with developmental needs such as 
proximity to resources (DLA, 2005). The LRAD model was dropped in 2010 with the new focus 
on the state-driven model, the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS) (DRDLR, 2010b).  
 
LRAD was a more explicitly market friendly approach, closer in design to the suggestions of the 
World Bank and other proponents of market-based land reforms than the SLAG programme had 
been (Lahiff, 2001). That followed a broader shift in the post liberation government’s economic 
policies that took a more market and investor-friendly direction with the adoption of the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macro-economic policy, in 1996. The LRAD 
programme had replaced an income ceiling under SLAG with an entry floor, requiring 
beneficiaries from all classes to make their own contributions to projects. It also put more 
emphasis on ensuring an economic benefit from land redistribution and the promotion of a black 
commercial farming sector (Lahiff, 2001). Similar to SLAG, LRAD had objectives such as 
improving the nutrition status and incomes of the poor and addressing the legacy of inequitable 
landholding in South Africa (DLA, 2001).    
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3.3. Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS)  
  
PLAS was introduced by the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs during the National Land 
Summit of 2005.One of the measures that needed to be in place was “to ensure that land and 
agrarian reform moves to the new trajectory that will contribute to the higher path of growth, 
employment and equity by 2014” through the “introduction of proactive land acquisition by the 
state for targeted groups in the land market” (MALA, 2005). This move was perpetuated by 
political pressure for government to drive land reform. 
 
The market based land acquisition wherein the state purchased land on behalf of the approved 
beneficiaries, was initially rejected by the state citing that the ‘supply led’ approach would risk 
the state being left with land which it could not maintain or disposed of. The land summit gave 
birth to the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS), which remained the sole redistribution 
mechanism by 2010. Under PLAS the state became the ‘willing buyer’ of land for redistribution, 
“(…) by actively using market opportunities where they arise” (Lahiff, 2008:7) in order to 
accelerate the land redistribution process. The state also approached land owners to sell, while 
under LRAD the state provided possible beneficiary grants in order for them to buy land. Under 
PLAS, the state bought land directly from the seller (Wachter, 2010:77).  
  
At the 2005 Land Summit the whole land reform programme was re-assessed in terms of its 
failures and achievements.  It  was  concluded  that  the  “willing  buyer-willing  seller”  
approach  was  delaying  the process, because those who own the land, determine which land 
goes to the market. Both SLAG and LRAD were viewed as demand driven land acquisition 
models; a new approach should be a supply led approach. That suggested that government 
should initiate a process of land identification, acquisition and warehousing, and then make it 
available to beneficiaries (DLA, 2006a:7).  
 
Therefore, the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy was adopted in 2006. It started as an 
intervention strategy to accelerate the land redistribution process. The approach deals with two 
possible alternatives: a needs-based approach and a supply-led approach (DLA, 2006a:6). Land 
is identified, acquired and developed by government to make it available to those who will lease 
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it from government. The strategy indicates that (DLA, 2006a:6) “the focus is on the government 
as a lead driver in land redistribution, rather than current beneficiary-driven redistribution. This 
means that the government will proactively purchase land and match this with the demand or 
need for land in a specific area.” 
 
Accordingly, proactive land acquisition must be executed within the ambit of local/district level 
IDP processes or area-based planning approach. Thus Municipalities and/or local/district 
agriculture may actively identify land and beneficiaries, and then approach the DLA for funding 
assistance for planning and land acquisitions. The DLA may also embark on the process (with 
the Municipality/District Council as lead agents and/or local/district Agriculture) of actively 
identifying needs, land and beneficiaries (DLA, 2006a:9). 
 
3.3.1. PLAS strategic objectives 
 
The strategy aimed at four particular pillars. The first is to accelerate the land redistribution 
process. The second is to ensure that land can be acquired at the nodal areas and in the identified 
agricultural corridors and other areas of high agricultural potential to meet the objectives of 
ASGISA. The third is to improve the identification and selection of beneficiaries and the 
planning of land on which people would be settled. The fourth is to ensure the maximum 
productive use of land acquired (DLA, 2006a:6). The PLAS is aimed at dealing with two 
approaches, namely a needs-based approach and a supply-led approach but essentially focusing 
on the state as the lead driver in land redistribution rather than beneficiary-driven redistribution. 
This means that the state identifies the land, purchases it and then makes it available to 
beneficiaries for lease. 
 
3.3.2. PLAS Legislative Framework 
 
The legislative framework which PLAS is based on remains the Provision of Land and 
Assistance Act, Act No. 126 of 1993. Section 10(1) (a) gives legal effect to the proactive 
acquisition of land, “The Minister may, from money appropriated by Parliament for this purpose-  
(a) acquire land for the purposes of this Act.” PLAS targets black people (Africans, Coloureds 
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and Indians), groups that live in communal areas, black people with the necessary farming skills 
in urban areas and people living under insecure tenure rights. The rationale is to contribute to the 
decongestion of the communal areas, secure on or off-farm accommodation and to create 
sustainable livelihoods. Additionally, the strategy also intended to cater for emergent and 
commercial farmers. 
 
3.3.3. Acquisition and Disposal Financing 
 
PLAS proposed that once beneficiary selection has been finalised, beneficiaries are expected to 
lease with an option to purchase and lease fees would also be taken into consideration once the 
applicants are ready to acquire full ownership of the land (DLA, 2006:8). The process of 
ownership transfer would be preceded by an assessment undertaken by the Department of 
Agriculture. Accordingly, the strategy indicates that leases are determined according to the 
length of a production cycle of a particular agricultural enterprise (DLA, 2006a:8). 
 
Once the trial-lease period expires the land can be disposed of to the same beneficiaries if they 
have been satisfactorily assessed by the Department of Agriculture. The strategy further indicates 
that a “qualifying grant” based on the LRAD grant system would be made available to 
beneficiaries and discounted against the purchase price. The sale price of the land would have 
been fixed at acquisition by the DLA. A further discount of 30% would be offered to all 
qualifying beneficiaries. If grants and the discounts are still not enough to reach the purchase 
price, then beneficiaries should be assisted to obtain finance from commercial financial 
institutions and development financial institutions such as the Land Bank. 
 
3.4. Land use patterns   
 
Lahiff (2007b:3) indicated a trend of projects being established between the four broad land use 
models and cutting across various economic sectors of agriculture, forestry, tourism, 
conservation and mining. These trends were identified in terms of (a) individual and or 
household access to land for small scale agricultural production which is popular in LRAD 
projects; (b) groups influenced by grant structure which are highly prevalent in SLAG projects; 
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(c) the joint ventures between beneficiaries and the private sector which are referred to as 
strategic partnerships in restitution projects; and (d) the contractual arrangements where control 
is handed over in return for some payment. The latter has reference experience in LRAD 
projects.  
 
3.4.1. Individual farming   
 
Under redistribution, individual production was introduced and promoted through LRAD as 
members qualified as individuals rather than as households (Jacobs et al. 2003). Individual 
qualification was unique to the programme since SLAG targeted households. . It is easy to 
identify small group projects in which most members are related to one another (Hall, 2009).  
 
Lahiff (2007b:3) also identified that settlement agreements and business plans for restitution 
cases tend towards unitary models of land use. The bias against small scale has been across both 
restitution and redistribution programmes through its SLAG and LRAD. It is in very limited 
instances where economic activities would be conducted collectively. This therefore raises a 
question of who is pursuing the collective practices in land reform between beneficiaries and the 
government (Hall, 2009). 
 
The promotion of collective solutions suggests that these trends originate in government 
practices rather than with communities themselves. Lahiff (2007b:4) argues that subdivision is 
ignored even where it is more feasible. Lahiff’s (2007b:4) argument advocates that 
individualization of land use would appear to have many advantages, given the type of resources 
being restored and typical skills, assets and livelihood needs of community members. The 
promotion of individualization has the potential to reduce conflicts over access to resources, the 
organization of production, the payment of bills and the distribution of benefits which are 
proving complicated and controversial in many land reform projects (Hall, 2009).   
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3.4.2. Collective access to land  
 
According to (Hall, 2009:26) “group access to land has been the dominant model of land use in 
most settled restitution claims. Similar trends have been identified in redistribution, particularly 
in SLAG projects. The large groups of poor people attempting group production, with minimal 
external support and limited capital, were largely blamed for the challenges experienced in 
SLAG projects.” Despite this accusation, LRAD continued to create similar types of projects due 
to the grant pattern. These group based projects are usually not limited to land ownership, but 
also include individual resources such as assets, labour, animals, mechanization, etc.  
 
Hall (2009:27) argues that “attempts to create instant successful replicas of white commercial 
farmers had been the cause of disappointing outcomes in land reform. This tendency often sets 
participants up for failure. Beneficiaries typically do not have the necessary working capital, or 
the financial skills to manage commercial types of enterprises.” Moreover, it would not be 
efficient for them to continue the highly capital intensive mode of production of white 
commercial farmers (MALA, 2003:12).   
 
However, Pienaar (2009:6) identifies that the rights of individual participants have simply not 
been determined or allocated within the community context. This lack of individual rights 
determination has led to the abuse of resources by those who are more powerful, particularly 
those that consider themselves as founders of the project, and this conduct also served as an 
instrument to drive others out of the project.  
 
3.4.3. Household production  
 
This model of land reform was introduced by LRAD which discontinued obligatory group 
productions through the SLAG model. As indicated by Hall (2009: 27), “land reform projects 
with individual or family based production are less common”. As noted by Lahiff (2007b:8), 
ambitious plans to engage jointly in production have sometimes failed to get off the ground. 
Where these were premised on the availability of infrastructure, capital and training did not 
materialize. A national review on communal property institutions (CPIs) found that projects in 
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which members where no longer involved were in contravention of their obligations and 
therefore could not access the balance of their grants from the government or enter into contracts 
with outside parties (CSIR, 2005). However, Lahiff et al (2008) argued that “attrition of 
members is often an outcome, rather than the cause, of project plans not being realized.”  
 
Production of crops for sale is more common as a group based enterprise, while production of 
food for consumption is usually conducted separately by households (Andrew et al, 2003). Hall 
(2009: 28) indicates that it is usually the exclusion of this production for consumption from the 
business plans which leads to deviation from planned land use. Moreover, project members often 
found that they do not derive immediate benefits from contributing labour and resources of group 
production, hence household based production has the ability to resist the departure temptation. 
This further suggests that, compared to the collective operation of commercial farms, household 
based production is a low risk strategy that allows poor people to produce for markets, but also to 
consume their produce, in the absence of other sources of income (Hall, 2009:29).  
 
3.4.4. Joint ventures, strategic partnership and co-management         
 
Mayson (2003:1) identified five broad types of joint ventures in land reform in South Africa, 
each of which involves partnerships between land reform beneficiaries and either state or private 
entities.  As indicated by Hall (2009:29), “joint ventures, strategic partnership and co-
management emerged in part because of the barriers in land acquisition at market based prices, 
but also in response of the limited operating capital faced by land reform beneficiaries.” The 
identified types of joint ventures include contract or out-grower schemes, share–equity schemes 
involving farm workers, municipal commonage schemes, share-produce or sharecropping 
schemes and company supported schemes (Mayson 2002:2).  
 
Mayson (2003:1) explains that contract farming is an agreement between small-scale farmers and 
processing or marketing firms, in which farmers agree to supply an agreed quantity of goods of a 
specified quality. In return, the farmers are paid for the produce, but also receive support such as 
credit, training and extension services.  This is an important model for smallholder production as 
it provides a means of bringing private sector support to resource poor producers, in the form of 
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access to input, credit, training and a secure market for produce. However, it should be noted that 
it is the content of these contracts that are controversial, because in a situation where a few major 
companies dominate a sector, they have substantial price-setting powers (Hall, 2009:31).  
 
Lahiff (2007b:9) defines share equity in agriculture as “arrangements in which farm workers, 
small scale farmers or other disadvantaged people buy shares in a commercial farm or an 
agricultural processing company.” This is done through the assistance of government through 
grants. Mayson (2003:2) identifies this model as a means to provide access to very cheap capital 
for commercial farmers who need to recapitalize their production. This view suggests that this 
model enables land reform beneficiaries to overcome the barriers of entry into these enterprises 
that are capital, technology, expertise and labour intensive. The joint ventures, strategic 
partnerships and joint management are prevalent in both restitution and redistribution 
programmes, particularly under LRAD.   
 
3.5. Conclusions  
 
It is evident that different land uses emerged as a result of particular redistribution programmes. 
SLAG by its design, created group projects. This programme required applicants to qualify as 
households, rather than as individuals. Secondly, the amount of the grant (R16 000) that each 
household qualified for, was not compatible with agricultural land prices, and this resulted in 
group farming which led to conflicts between members of the group, to the extent of abandoning 
the farms.  
 
Government considers redistribution as its flagship (Van den Brink et.al. 2006:28). However, the 
introduction of LRAD launched the individual farming model where applicants qualified as 
individuals. This programme also introduced additional land uses such as individual production 
and group based production. SLAG allowed for household production where one family 
accessed land with either relatives or on their own; it also made provision for joint ventures, 
partnerships and co-management. Both SLAG and LRAD required applicants to look for a land, 
while PLAS appeared as an intervention strategy which deals with two alternatives, namely a 
need based approach and a supply-led approach (DLA, 2007a:6). : In terms of PLAS “the focus 
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is on the government as a lead driver in land redistribution, rather than beneficiary-driven 
redistribution as experienced during SLAG and LRAD implementation (DLA, 2007a:6). This 
means that the government proactively purchased land and matches this with the demand or need 
for land in a specific area.” 
 
PLAS was constructed on four particular pillars. Firstly, PLAS intended to accelerate the land 
redistribution process by eliminating a grant system which was limited to a particular amount of 
funding (DLA, 2006a:6). By doing this, PLAS eliminated a challenge where applicants failed to 
purchase the land because they could not secure additional funds to supplement the grant for land 
purchase. The second objective was to ensure that land can be acquired at the nodal areas and in 
the identified agricultural corridors and other areas of high agricultural potential to meet the 
objectives of ASGISA (DLA, 2006a:6). This objective introduced a focus of where land should 
be purchased, which is a unique land identification model in land reform. The result of this 
objective was the introduction of the Area Based Plan (ABP) which intended to identify potential 
areas. However, the ABP could not be concluded in most provinces and it has  been changed to 
the Rural Development and Land Reform Plan (RDLRP) whereby all provinces are expected to 
develop and review their ABPs. Thirdly, PLAS intended to improve the identification and 
selection of beneficiaries and the planning of land on which people would be settled (DLA, 
2006a:6). This objective had its focus on matching land with beneficiaries and the result of that 
was the beneficiary categorization in terms of their farming potentials, skills and resources. The 
fourth objective was to ensure maximum productive use of land acquired (DLA, 2006a:7).  
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CHAPTER 4: THE IMPLEMENTATION AND PROGRAMME OUTCOMES IN 
GAUTENG PROVINCE 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
The Provincial Shared Services Centre: Gauteng (PSSC:G), formerly known as Gauteng 
Provincial Land Reform Office (GPLRO) started to implement the Proactive Land Acquisition 
Strategy (PLAS) since its commencement in 2006. There were no specific targeted areas in the 
province and beneficiaries targeted were similar to that of LRAD (Mphela interview, 2012). The 
implementation of the strategy was adapted to the existing LRAD programme. The introduction 
of the strategy arrived when PSSC:G was struggling to produce the desired targeted results. By 
2004/5, the national target was to transfer 372 projects with a total extent of 120 128ha to 8418 
beneficiaries, but only 328 projects with a total extent of 72 686ha were transferred to 5709 
beneficiaries (DLA, 2005). The challenges included failure to match the grant with the land 
prices. By 2006, the LRAD grant was still ranging between R20 000 and R100 000 per 
individual. As indicated in the annual reports, in the 2006/7 financial year, Gauteng only 
transferred 1257 hectares under LRAD.  This strain was also observed in other provinces such as 
Limpopo, where only 12 LRAD projects were transferred by the end of the 2006/7 financial year 
(DLA, 2007). A total number of 135 LRAD projects were initiated in Gauteng since 2001 and it 
benefited 2 220 households. Moreover, SLAG had also transferred 4 897.2150 hectares which 
created 50 projects and benefited 3 717 households.   
 
Gauteng Province had transferred a total of 21 982 hectares under PLAS by the end of December 
2009 (DRDLR, 2010a). This has benefited 5 971 households which translate into 7 397 
individuals. Considering that PLAS was initiated in 2006, the transfer of 21 982 constituted a 
magnificent performance as compared to LRAD which had transferred only 6 674 hectares by 
the end of December 2009, since August 2001. As indicated by Andrew et al (2003) the slow 
delivery was amongst other reasons, ascribed to the grant structure whereby applicants were 
required to add equity and debt capital to qualify for a maximum grant (Andrew et al, 2003).   
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4.2. Land redistribution delivery trends 
 
4.2.1. National redistribution performance  
 
During the period 2007 to 2010 there have been significant changes in the implementation of 
land redistribution programmes, with PLAS showing high performance.  However, PLAS was 
showing a significant contribution compared to all the other redistribution models combined.  
The highest peak was in the 2008/9 financial year with a significant decline in the 2009/10 
financial year. By that time, DRDLR was adjusting to its strategic transition. Between 2007 and 
2009, the number of projects and hectares of PLAS were competitive as compared to other 
redistribution products combined. The average number of hectares per project had been 
consistent and increasing under PLAS while other programmes had been consistently decreasing.      
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Table 4.1. Performance comparison of number of projects and hectares when PLAS was introduced (DLA, 2008c; DRDLR, 2009a; DRDLR, 2010a) 
  * Others include LRAD, Commonage, SLAG, and SPLAG 
   
 
Programme  2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 
 No of 
projects  
  
No of ha  Average 
no per ha 
per 
project 
No of 
projects  
  
No of ha  Average 
no per ha 
per 
project 
No of 
projects 
  
No of ha  Average 
no per ha 
per project 
No of 
projects  
  
No of 
ha  
Average 
no per ha 
per 
project 
No of 
projects  
  
No 
of ha  
Aver. 
no per 
ha per 
project 
No of 
projects  
  
No of 
ha  
Average 
no per 
ha per 
project 
PLAS  191 171559 898 217 226986 1046 98 99433 1014 Unspecifi
ed  
276396 - 310 3928
50 
 Unspec
ified 
15755
6 
Unspeci
fied  
Others*  194 174452 899 283 216614 765 276 140557 509 Unspecifi
ed  
46448 - 0 0 0 0  0 0 
Total  385 346011 898 500 443600 887 374 239990 641 288 322884 1121 310 3928
50 
1267 - 15755
6 
- 
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Figure 4.1. Performance comparison of number of hectares per annum when PLAS was introduced 
(DLA, 2008c; DRDLR, 2009a; DRDLR, 2010a) 
 
PLAS displayed a very good potential when compared to the other redistribution models 
combined as indicated on table 4.1 and figure 4.1. As compared to LRAD, there is no own 
contribution expected for this transaction. LRAD projects which were deadlocked due to 
insufficient own contributions were converted to PLAS and purchased immediately (Manaka 
interview, 2011).  A significant decline of PLAS projects was observed in 2009/10 where 
projects declined from 217 projects in 2008/9 to 98 projects in 2009/10 (DRDLR, 2010a). By 
that time, PLAS had already been implemented for three years and DRDLR was confronted with 
post-allocation support challenges. That included management of lease agreements, abandoned 
farms, farm assets registers and repairs of mechanical equipment (Mogaswa interview, 2011). As 
a result, there has been a greater concentration on dealing with those challenges, than on 
continuous acquisition. That challenge was new to redistribution because with other 
programmes, with the exception of commonage, land is owned by the beneficiaries; but 
government remained a property owner under PLAS.   
It is important to note that the end of LRAD was marked with 46 448 hectares and at the time 
PLAS performance was growing (DRDLR, 2011:33). There has been significant changes in the 
delivery of land in 2012/13 when only 157 556 hectares were delivered. This is attributed to the 
departmental policy change from a hectare-driven approach to acquisition of going-concerns 
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(existing agricultural business concerns). Furthermore, 25% of the land acquisition budget was 
shifted to fund the Recapitalization and Development Programme (DRDLR, 2013a:39). 
Table 4.2. National redistribution performance post increased redistribution grants (DRDLR, 
2009a; DRDLR, 2010a) 
Province  Hectares  No of projects 
Others* PLAS Others* PLAS 
08/09 09/10 08/09 09/10 08/09 09/10 08/09 09/10 
Eastern Cape  14 919 15 144 32 603 24 533 26 31 33 33 
Free State  8 727 17 821 55 514 12 390 25 44 73 11 
Gauteng  0 378 2 554 1 366 0 7 16 13 
KwaZulu Natal  59 528 41 742 6 010 1 679 95 62 20 4 
Limpopo  12 208 8 960 2 392 5 743 70 71 3 6 
Mpumalanga  15 246 11 657 37 025 17 423 17 16 48 19 
Northern Cape 81 114 29 441 44 247 27 386 17 9 8 5 
North West  6 231 7 857 46 636 5 183 14 20 16 5 
Western Cape 18 637 7 553 0 3 725 19 16 0 2 
* Others include LRAD, Commonage, SLAG, and SPLAG 
Even though provinces such as North West and Free State struggled to pose significant land 
transfers in 2008/9, the situation was worse in Gauteng, where no project was transferred through 
other programmes (DRDLR, 2009a). This suggests that Gauteng replaced other programmes 
with PLAS, hence provinces like Western Cape continued with programmes other than PLAS. In 
2009/10, Gauteng transferred 7 projects through other programmes; hence PLAS was also not 
showing much contribution. This occurred amidst several warnings by the Deputy Director 
General of Land Reform and the Director General that PLAS was not meant to replace LRAD, 
but should be considered a strategy of acquiring land. In both years KwaZulu Natal continued to 
have major transfers through programmes other than PLAS. Similar trends were observed in 
Limpopo and the Western Cape Province. That showed that some provinces decided to replace 
existing programmes with this one; others started slowly to adopt it in addition to existing 
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programmes. Some provinces viewed PLAS as a quicker land acquisition model; hence others 
were skeptical about administrative responsibilities after land has been transferred.  
The number of projects transferred in Gauteng do not translate to more hectares because even 
when a higher number of projects are transferred, the total number of hectares transferred 
remains small as compared to the Northern Cape Province where only eight projects yielded 44 
247 ha and five projects yielded 27 386 ha. On that note, if delivery was measured on the number 
of projects transferred, Gauteng would appear to be delivering substantially. However, delivery 
is measured in terms of the number of hectares transferred, despite the equal efforts required to 
complete a project. When DRDLR sets annual targets, they are based on the number of hectares 
which should be transferred, and provinces are therefore targeting those hectares. The same 
method of targeting is also emphasized on DRDLR annual reports and they are the main delivery 
targets (DLA, 2006b, DLA, 2007e, DLA, 2008c, DRDLR, 2009a, DRDLR, 2010a).  
 
4.2.2. A national profile of beneficiaries  
 
The table below shows that the highest number of beneficiaries in land redistribution was 
recorded in KwaZulu Natal, Western Cape and Mpumalanga Provinces and the lowest were in 
the Gauteng Province. This is not surprising given the numbers of projects transferred and the 
total hectares transferred. In the Western Cape Province, the land transferred benefited 563 
persons with disability followed by KwaZulu Natal which transferred land to 91 disabled 
beneficiaries. Women also benefited in high numbers in the KwaZulu Natal Province in both 
years followed by Western Cape and Mpumalanga.  
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Table 4.3. Comparatives on distribution of benefits on land redistribution between 2008 and 2010 
(DRDLR, 2009a, DRDLR, 2010a). 
Province  Individuals  Females  Farm workers  Youth  Disabled persons 
08/09 09/10 08/09 09/10 08/09 09/10 08/09 09/10 08/09 09/10 
EC 772 844 195 193 59 116 153 117 2 0 
FS 144 382 53 189 42 30 40 89 0 0 
GP 44 74 28 26 0 0 9 18 0 0 
KZN 9449 4158 2279 2250 258 38 1755 1990 91 1 
LP 550 563 293 286 164 113 215 275 6 14 
MP 1177 1053 402 411 0 0 446 593 0 1 
NC 364 98 48 39 232 14 46 41 1 2 
NW 238 3117 35 1872 1 0 27 549 0 0 
WC 1719 1073 578 529 993 901 0 466 563 14 
TOTAL 14457 11362 3911 5795 1749 1212 2691 4138 663 32 
 
4.2.3. Gauteng land redistribution delivery prior to the introduction of PLAS 
 
It is clear that more LRAD applications where received in 2004/5, but only 18.7% were 
successful (DLA, 2005). The low percentage of transfer is attributed to the design of the LRAD 
programme whose benefit was conditionally attached to beneficiaries’ contributions.  
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TABLE 4.4. The performance of different redistribution models in Gauteng Province (DLA, 2007e; 
DLA, 2008c, DRDLR, 2009a, DRDLR, 2010a) 
Contents  2006/2007 2007/2008 2008/2009 2009/2010 
     
Number of projects  48 45 16 20 
Total hectares transferred  10 533 10 188 2 554 1 745 
Minimum hectares per project 2.0 2.0 8 8 
Maximum hectares per project 1365 1390 980 340 
Budget spent  90 971 120 87 175 283 14 046 000 25 118 000 
Donations  1 0 0 0 
Beneficiaries  263 186 81 148 
Maximum number of beneficiaries 96* 10 10 10 
Women  68 92 28 26 
Youth  27 Unspecified  9 18 
LRAD projects  10 7 0 7 
PLAS projects  33 38 16 13 
ESTA projects  2 0 0 0 
Commonage projects  1 0 0 0 
Settlement projects 2 0 0 0 
*only in donated settlement land, but the rest are at a maximum of 10 beneficiaries 
The decline of the number of projects is ascribed to the contestation between land acquisition 
and PLAS administrative support by the project officers. Since the same project officers who 
facilitated land acquisition were expected to still provide support to beneficiaries, more time was 
invested in the support of beneficiaries than to continuous land acquisition (Maleswene 
interview, 2012). The capacity to carry on with land acquisition was compromised.  
When PLAS was initiated in the 2006/7 financial year, a total number of 48 projects were 
transferred and only 10 LRAD projects were transferred, yet 33 PLAS projects were transferred, 
2 ESTA projects were transferred, 1 commonage and two settlement projects were transferred 
(DLA, 2007e). In total, 10 533ha where transferred, and this benefited 263 beneficiaries with 
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only 25% of them being women and 10.3% being youth. It should be noted that although the 
Gauteng PLRO transferred 33 PLAS projects, LRAD was declining because only 10 LRAD 
projects were transferred. This was a significant decline of LRAD projects compared to the 
previous year where 37 LRAD projects were transferred. This decline was measured at 72.9%. 
The decline of LRAD was due to increasing land prices as compared to the available LRAD 
grant (Sebaeng interview, 2013). 
The introduction of PLAS contributed to the compromise of LRAD because officials of DRDLR 
chased a quicker land delivery model which does not require applicants to put an equity and/ or 
debt capital to prove own contribution, unlike LRAD (Maleswene interview, 2012). Table 4.4. 
shows a trend of a significant decline in LRAD projects in the first three years of the PLAS 
implementation. This is influenced by the reality that officials’ performance is measured by the 
number of hectares they have transferred. As a result, a model which can yield such results will 
naturally find favour from project officers.   
During the financial year 2007/8, Gauteng transferred only 7 LRAD projects which amounted to 
352ha and benefited 40 beneficiaries.  This is an average of 8ha per individual (DLA, 2008). 
However, a total number of 38 PLAS projects were transferred and this amounted to 9836ha and 
this benefited 136 individual beneficiaries which translate to an average of 73ha per beneficiary. 
A continuous decline in the number of LRAD projects coincided with an increase in the number 
of PLAS projects compared to the previous financial year. This suggests that the simplicity of 
acquiring land through PLAS received favour from officials to meet their targets quicker 
(Mogaswa interview, 2011).   
During the financial year 2008/9, the province did not transfer any LRAD projects. This was 
despite the increase of LRAD grants from a scale of between R20 000 and R100 000 per 
individual beneficiary, to a scale of between R111 152 and R430 857. However, the Gauteng 
PLRO was the only province which did not transfer LRAD projects during that financial year. 
The performance of LRAD during that financial year confirms that the province abandoned 
LRAD even in areas where it was feasible to purchase land through LRAD. PLAS was a quicker 
method of transferring projects as compared to LRAD, where land could be lost while awaiting a 
bank loan approval to supplement the grant (Mogaswa interview, 2011).  
 
 
 
 
43 
 
In 2008/9, sixteen PLAS projects were transferred and yielded 2 554ha, which benefited 44 
beneficiaries (DLA, 2009a).  These beneficiaries were composed of 28 female beneficiaries and 
9 youth. In that year, there was a significant decline in the number of hectares transferred, even 
under PLAS, i.e. there was a 74.02% decline. Project officers were occupied with the 
administration of the transferred properties and neglected the continuous purchase of the land. In 
addition, provinces where cautioned not to use PLAS as a replacement of LRAD (DLA, 2008d).  
By the end of the 2009/10 financial year, the resuscitation of LRAD projects has been observed 
where LRAD project started to be processed again as compared to the previous year where no 
LRAD project was processed. About 7 LRAD projects were transferred by the end of the 
2009/10 financial year (DRDLR, 2010a). Accordingly, the resurrection of LRAD projects were 
influenced by the PLAS audit which discovered a wide range of challenges that PLAS was faced 
with (Mamphodo interview, 2011). As a result, officials were cautioned to concentrate on LRAD 
projects rather than PLAS projects. However, about 15 PLAS projects had been transferred by 
the end of the 2009/10 financial year. It should be noted that re-emergence  of LRAD did not 
outnumber the magnitude of PLAS. It is evident that the province was not coping in delivering 
land either through LRAD or PLAS. At that stage, there was a lot of public pressure as members 
of the public continued to lodge complaints about the slow pace of processing their applications. 
That resulted in a high number of ministerial and presidential enquiries by 2009 (Nchabeleng 
interview, 2013). The enquiries also contributed to the delivery pressure that project officers 
were already feeling. To appease applicants, beneficiaries were attached to the same land they 
had brought even when such applicants were under resourced to produce on the land.     
 
4.2.4. The end of LRAD  
 
LRAD was initiated in August 2001 with a grant that ranged between R20 000 and R100 000 per 
individual. The grant structure was later increased to between R111 000 and R430 000 per 
individual applicant, depending on their contributions. However, the significance of grant 
increase could not be confirmed to Gauteng Province. Table 4.5 shows a constant higher 
prevalence of PLAS than LRAD. Accordingly, if applicants could not prove their ability to raise 
own contribution, such an application would be converted to PLAS (Mphela interview, 2012). In 
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June 2010, the Director-General of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 
issued a circular indicating the termination of land acquisition through other models of land 
acquisition such as LRAD, Settlement and Production Land Acquisition Grant, Commonage, and 
any other grant from capital transfers. The only land acquisition model remaining was PLAS. 
The rationale behind the termination was that government had limited access to all land which 
was purchased for beneficiaries under LRAD as it is registered in the name of the beneficiaries 
as a private property. That was after government was criticized by the public for leaving tracts of 
land abandoned by the beneficiaries (Cousins, 2009).  
 
By the end of 2010/11financial year, Gauteng had showed the following performance: 
 
Table 4.5. Gauteng land acquisition performance when LRAD was terminated in the 
2010/11 financial year 
Programme  No of projects  Ha No of beneficiaries 
    
LRAD 6 360 59 
PLAS  8 1013 Unspecified  
SPLAG  5 387 102 
Commonage  1 1062 Unspecified  
 
Table 4.6. Gauteng PLAS performance since inception (DLA, 2007e, DLA, 2008c, DRDLR, 
2009a, DRDLR, 2010a, DRDLR, 2011, DRDLR, 2012, DRDLR, 2013a) 
Item  2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 
        
Number of 
PLAS Projects 
33 38 16 13 13 21 14 
Number of 
PLAS hectares  
10533 9836 2554 1366 2603 3069 3204 
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Figure 4.2. Gauteng number of PLAS projects performance to date (DLA, 2007e, DLA, 
2008c, DRDLR, 2009a, DRDLR, 2010a, DRDLR, 2011, DRDLR, 2012, DRDLR, 2013a) 
 
Figure 4.3. Gauteng number of PLAS hectares performance to date (DLA, 2007e, DLA, 
2008c, DRDLR, 2009a, DRDLR, 2010a, DRDLR, 2011, DRDLR, 2012, DRDLR, 2013a) 
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Table 4.6 and Figure 4.1 indicate the performance of PLAS since its inception in 2006/7 with a 
dramatic decline of the extent of land acquired during the third year of its implementation. The 
fourth year shows a total decline where the province acquired below 2000 hectares. This decline 
is also attributed to the departmental transition from being the Department of Land Affairs to the 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform which brought some uncertainties to the 
land acquisition model (Naidoo interview, 2013). Although at a slow pace, there was growth in 
the number of hectares from 2010.  
 
4.3. PLAS role players  
 
PLAS was introduced when project approval processes were already established through SLAG 
and LRAD. As a result, the approval processes of PLAS were adapted to the LRAD approval 
process, except that a feasibility study had to be conducted to evaluate the agricultural potential 
of the land, and that an added responsibility to select beneficiaries was introduced. With LRAD, 
beneficiaries would identify the land they desired to have, and organised their institutional 
arrangement even without proper guidance from the officials, whereas in PLAS, beneficiaries are 
subjected to an interview by different stakeholders.   
 
4.3.1. District Screening Committee (DSC) 
 
As required by the LRAD policy, when a project is identified, an agricultural potential report 
must be compiled (DLA, 2001). The Gauteng PLRO liaised with officials from the Gauteng 
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (GDARD) to view the farm and compile an 
assessment report which informs the DSC about the potential of the land. This structure is 
mandated to screen applications and recommend the release of the Planning Grant which is 
meant for conducting valuations, business plans, feasibility reports, subdivisions, legal entities, 
etc.  
 
PLAS projects were approved based on the feasibility, which is a comprehensive agricultural 
potential report, which mapped potential commodities (Mamphodo interview, 2011). This is 
because, at an approval stage, no one has been awarded the property, so the production intentions 
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would not be known at that stage and it will be irrelevant to develop a business plan. There was a 
lot of flexibility on how projects are dealt with within this structure. Maleswene’s interview 
(2012) notes inconsistency in attendance by members which resulted in limited follow-up on the 
progress of projects.   
 
4.3.2. Beneficiary Selection Committee (BSC) 
 
A similar model and process outlined on the LRAD policy document in establishing the DSC 
was used in establishing the BSC as guided by the PLAS manual. This forum was established at 
the district level, and the composition was the same as the DSC which include national 
departments, provincial departments and the local government represented by both district and 
local municipalities. Meetings of the BSC were scheduled on the same dates as the DSC to allow 
the forum to handle the two different mandates, i.e. the mandate to acquire property and the 
mandate to recommend beneficiaries to lease the land. These meetings were held at three 
different districts of the province.  This study could not confirm the effectiveness of the BSC, but 
it has established that there were no distinct differences between its functions and the DSC 
functions.   
 
It appears that the transition of PLAS from SLAG and LRAD was not managed to an extent of 
emphasizing the selection of beneficiaries. This was despite the PLAS objective of identifying 
suitable beneficiaries to lease the property. Most of the properties purchased under PLAS were 
identified by the applicants and leased to the same applicants. The BSC’s responsibility was 
therefore to endorse the same applicants who identified the property (Nkosi’s interview, 2013). 
However, the BSC was consistent with the recommendation of beneficiaries not exceeding ten 
within one project as advised by the Provincial Grant Approval Committee (PGAC).  
This has, in most cases, compromised the selection processes. Beneficiaries would be allocated 
land based on their efforts in identifying land, rather than on their ability and potential to 
produce. This study confirmed significant mismatching between beneficiaries and the land they 
are leasing. The allocation of beneficiaries to properties followed the same pattern observed in 
both SLAG and LRAD where land was allocated to those who had identified it.  
 
 
 
 
48 
 
 
4.3.3. Provincial Grant Approval Committee (PGAC) 
 
This forum is provincially based and it is chaired by a Chief Director from either the PLRO or 
GDARD. Projects were presented at this forum when they had completed all planning activities 
such as presentation to the DSC, valuation, Business Plan and/or Feasibility studies, formation of 
legal entity, etc. This forum takes a final decision on the purchase of the property but not its 
allocation. The composition of the forum includes government departments, the Land Bank, the 
National Marketing Council (NMC), the Agricultural Research Council (ARC) and the local 
municipalities. All purchased properties were subjected to this committee for final land 
acquisition approval. When LRAD projects were adjudicated, the PGAC’s main concern was 
based on the affordability status of the beneficiaries if the loan was required, the number of 
beneficiaries on the project, and the viability of the project. 
 
Given the conflicts around the number of beneficiaries in SLAG projects, the PGAC resolved 
that a maximum number of beneficiaries per project should be ten (Mogaswa interview, 2011). 
This was done with the idea of avoiding another crowded model experienced during SLAG 
implementation. Even though this decision was not guided by a policy framework, the PGAC 
was concerned that if the number of beneficiaries per project were not controlled, similar 
experiences of SLAG could be repeated. This decision was also implemented in PLAS projects 
where BSCs were cautioned about the expected maximum number of beneficiaries. The PGAC 
promoted the issue of a maximum of ten members by approving projects on condition that the 
number of beneficiaries would be reduced to at least ten, in case there were more. As a result all 
district structures absorbed that as a mini-policy of the PGAC.    
 
4.3.4. Alignment of PLAS to LRAD processes 
 
PLAS was aligned to the existing LRAD approval processes even though PLAS proposed a 
different approach. According to the second version of the PLAS implementation manual, the 
process begins with the needs analysis and project identification by the state. The two identified 
tools include the Area Based Plans (ABP), which should assist in identifying possible areas for 
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land reform and Integrated Development Plans (IDP), which identify municipal development 
plans of the area. The land would then be acquired followed by the proper project planning and 
development plans. The latter would include the selection of beneficiaries who will sign a lease 
agreement for a trial period of three years (DLA, 2007a:22). In the event where the lessee proves 
to be a competent farmer, then the property would be transferred to the beneficiary through 
LRAD.  
 
In that case, the department will develop a measuring tool which will assist to measure the 
beneficiaries’ state of readiness. “Once a particular lease period has expired and the selected 
beneficiaries have demonstrated their farming capabilities after the Department of Agriculture 
has assessed their performance, the beneficiaries will be given the opportunity to exercise the 
option to purchase. The DLA at this stage will consider applicable grants as per the LRAD grant 
system, lease fees paid and other discounts before disposing of the land to the beneficiaries” 
(DLA, 2006a:19). It is assumed that the tool will be able to determine if there is any 
improvement on production from occupation to the time of assessment. In case the beneficiary 
satisfies this process, then the land will be transferred to the farmers through LRAD with the 
farmers’ investments on the land and lease amount considered as own contributions.   
The sale price of the land would have been fixed at acquisition by the DLA. A further discount 
of 30% would be offered to all qualifying beneficiaries. If grants and the discounts are still not 
enough to reach the purchase price, then beneficiaries should be assisted to obtain finance from 
commercial financial institutions and Development financial institutions such as the Land Bank 
(DLA, 2006a:12). This was not achieved as no PLAS farm was sold. 
 
4.4. Conclusions  
 
Considering the fact that the provinces’ performance is measured by national office on the basis 
of the number of hectares transferred, it appears that in Gauteng Province, the introduction of 
PLAS in 2006 brought a significant change in land delivery. In the 2006 and 2007 periods, the 
province acquired more hectares through PLAS than all other redistribution programmes 
combined. This was despite national office’s call that PLAS should not be used to replace 
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LRAD. This proves that the province embraced this model of land acquisition from the 
beginning of its implementation. The DSC continued to recommend projects for land purchase 
while PGAC remained the approval body (Manaka’s interview, 2011).   
 
However, this performance was not sustained because in the 2008/9 financial year, there was a 
significant decline in the land acquired through PLAS. The high land delivery through PLAS 
was sustained for only two consecutive years. The decline is attributed to a number of factors 
which include the audit report which discovered abandoned PLAS projects, the DLA assuming 
the administrative role of managing beneficiaries’ contracts and the dual responsibility of project 
officers to acquire and manage projects. The rapid purchasing in the first two years is believed to 
have influenced land prices as there were a number of properties which were valued but the 
department did not agree on the selling price (Mahlangu’s interview, 2013).   Challenges such as 
the lack of production capital, lack of training and capacity building, lack of project and business 
management skills, etc. continued to confront the new breed of land reform.  
It is in PLAS where the institutional arrangements of the projects were such that leases could be 
entered into with a limited number of beneficiaries, unlike in SLAG and LRAD where grants 
influenced the number of participants per project. In Gauteng there were projects where land was 
leased to individuals, while other projects remained group-based projects. A ‘rent a crowd’ 
model was the normal practice in SLAG and LRAD. In this case, properties were leased to 
between an individual to a group of a maximum of 10 members organized into a legal entity. The 
number of beneficiaries was determined by the PGAC without any national policy framework 
guiding the matter.  
Projects were adapted to the existing approval structures such as DSC and PGAC with the 
addition of the BSC. These structures were established to assess redistribution applications in the 
districts against prioritisation criteria and made recommendations towards the prioritisation, 
feasibility assessments and possible approval of such projects. These structures were meant to 
ensure cooperative governance regarding land redistribution, as well as the joint management of 
projects by both government and non-governmental organisations. This adaptation resulted in the 
same institutions adjudicating LRAD to continue on PLAS projects. Decisions such as the 
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maximum number of beneficiaries in a project continued to be implemented as agreed in LRAD 
projects, even though the dynamics were different.  
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CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDIES 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
The research and case studies focus on the three main objectives of PLAS. Firstly, this chapter 
assesses the manner in which each project was established. This includes investigation of the 
process of identifying and selection of beneficiaries of the project. The assessment further 
analyzes the socio-economic status of the beneficiaries and their level of involvement in the daily 
activities of the project. Considering the group dynamics experienced by PLAS predecessors 
such as SLAG and LRAD, this chapter investigates the cohesive arrangements between the 
members and how that arrangement improved on the previous redistribution experiences.   
 
Secondly, this chapter investigates the manner in which the land was acquired. The PLAS 
strategy requires that land should be acquired in a strategically located area, and this chapter 
investigates the manner in which the land was identified including the key players in the process. 
The report includes a comparison with LRAD, which was the contesting land acquisition model, 
and considers the differences and similarities between the two. The report also assesses how 
LRAD has influenced and/or prejudiced decisions taken to implement PLAS projects. 
Additionally, the report includes the efforts shown by the applicants throughout the whole 
process of acquisition, including the role of other role players within the process. 
Thirdly, this chapter reviews the planning activities of the project and how beneficiaries ventured 
into the productive land uses since occupation. This includes an investigation of the manner in 
which the land is utilized and the commodities produced and how that differed from the 
production of the previous land owner.  
Finally, the report assesses the business part of the project which includes project management, 
lease agreement, marketing of the produce, training and extension services provided by other 
role players.    
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5.2. Lutendo Cooperative 
 
Items  Description  
Project name  Lutendo Cooperative  
Property description  Portion 30 (a Portion of Portion 17) of the 
Farm Elandsfontein 277 IQ 
Number of hectares  146. 6748 hectares 
Number of beneficiaries  10 
Purchase price  R2 100 000 
 
5.2.1. Background 
 
Lutendo Cooperative is a project located 30km south-west of Randfontein, which is about 40km 
from Johannesburg and falls under the Randfontein Municipality. The project started as a non-
profit organization (NPO) and was registered as Lutendo Community Project. The idea was 
initiated by the Daba family, whose breadwinner had been retrenched in 1992. Their intention 
was to acquire land which will assist them with an agricultural business for their livelihood. 
After retrenchment the couple started a small knitting business which they later abandoned and 
moved to Botswana to pursue employment and business opportunities. The family returned to 
South Africa and stayed in Limpopo Province, where they are originally from, and later relocated 
to Annadale which is an informal settlement in Gauteng Province. With their passion for 
agricultural production, and the pressure of financial instability, the couple approached the local 
Ward Councilor for an agricultural piece of land owned by the City of Johannesburg Metro 
(CJM).  The CJM makes available pieces of land for housing and other developments (Manaka 
interview, 2011). Some municipalities benefited from the Land Reform Commonage Programme 
(Mogaswa interview, 2011). The Ward Councilor arranged with the CJM, but they were advised 
to mobilize other people as government preferred to help more people than just two individuals 
(Daba interview, 2010a). The couple recruited members of their community. By 2004, the group 
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grew to 368 members who ultimately registered as Lutendo Community Project. CJM released 
its 90ha agricultural land without any lease contract. The couple was allocated 3 hectares where 
they produced cash crops during summer, targeting informal markets (Daba interview, 2010a).  
 
By mid-2005 the group started experiencing challenges. There was a shortage of water after their 
borehole ran dry. The Gauteng Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (GDARD) 
intervened by drilling and providing another borehole. The borehole did not last long before it 
ran dry as well. Annadale generally has a shortage of underground water (Tlale interview, 2010). 
Although CJM approached Rand Water to supply water through the use of tankers, the plan was 
not sustainable (Daba interview, 2010a). The constant shortage of water started discouraging 
other members.  
There were rumours that CJM intended to take back the land in favour of a low cost housing 
project. Although that was not confirmed, it added salt to the wound coupled with internal 
conflicts between members (Daba interview, 2010b). CJM had mobilized a tractor and 
production inputs from BP South Africa. The distribution, management and usage of those 
resources contributed to conflicts and disruptions and  ultimately led to the collupse of the 
project. The project was abandoned and the couple started looking for alternative land.  
 
5.2.2. Land acquisition process  
 
After withdrawing from Lutendo Community Project, the couple attended a farmers’ information 
session meeting convened by GDARD, and they learned about land reform (Daba interview, 
2010a). GDARD conducted road shows to inform communities about land reform programmes 
(Tlale interview, 2010). The couple accessed application forms from GDARD. DRDLR had an 
agreement with GDARD that application forms would be accessed from their Regional Offices 
because DRDLR only operated from one central provincial office (Mogaswa interview, 2011). 
Though the couple had not identified a property they later identified a 5 hectares plot which they 
were discouraged to pursue because government does not purchase small plots, but farms. 
Discussions in both DSC and PGAC discouraged the acquisition of plots due to their high cost 
compared to their limited return in investment, in terms of hectares (Manaka interview, 2011). 
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The couple later identified two properties through the assistance of a project officer from 
DRDLR. Project Officers had established relationships with estate agents particularly if they had 
previous successful transactions (Maleswene interview, 2012). It took them a period of more 
than eight months to identify Portion 30 (a Portion of Portion 17) of the Farm Elandsfontein 277 
IQ which is 146 hectares in size. The couple were not involved in the price negotiation 
processes. Beneficiaries are only responsible for land identification (Mogaswa interview, 2011).  
 
5.2.3. Lease contract management  
 
Lutendo Cooperative entered into a lease agreement with DRDLR in December 2007 (DLA, 
2007b). One of the obligations on the contract was to pay 6% of the purchase price annually for 
the duration of the contract (DLA, 2007b:5). This property was purchased at R2.1 million and 
the expected lease amount was R126 000 per annum. The lease agreement expired in October 
2010 and it was renewed for another three years, despite the cooperative’s failure to pay the 
lease. This was despite section 8 of the lease agreement which states: “Should the Lessee fail to 
pay the rental, interest shall be payable at the current interest rate per annum as determined by 
the Minister of Finance from time to time, in terms of section 80 of the Public Finance 
Management Act, 1999 (Act 1 of 1999). A certificate by the accounting section of the LESSOR 
shall be prima facie proof of such interest rate” (DLA, 2007b:6).  
 
This was after failed attempts by DRDLR to recover that amount (Maponya interview, 2010). 
DRDLR wrote letters of demand to all defaulting farmers, and that process was withdrawn to 
give way to the Recapitalization and Development Programme (RADP). The view of DRDLR is 
that beneficiaries would have to explain their reasons for non-payment after government had 
supported them through the RADP (Mamphodo interview, 2011). The inability to raise funds 
was also largely attributed to the lease’s tenure period of three years (Daba interview, 2010a).  
There was a concern that the three-year lease agreement did not assist them when they looked for 
production capital from the commercial and development banks because of uncertainty of 
renewal of the contract (Mamphodo interview, 2011).  
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5.2.4. Beneficiary selection and membership  
 
Given their past experience, the couple resorted to mobilizing their family members and close 
relatives. Lutendo Cooperative is a two-household project with 10 members. The second 
household is a close relative of the Daba couple. Family members and relatives are easy to work 
with (Daba interview, 2010b). Apart from this project, they have a good history of working 
together regarding family burial societies, religious activities, and cultural activities (Daba 
interview, 2010b). As a result, they built confidence on each other.     
 
Lutendo Cooperative is composed of ten members of different ages. Three of the members are 
aged between 45 and 60 years and the other seven members are aged between 20 and 35 years 
and one member is a pensioner. The majority of the members are youth, but their involvement in 
the project is limited. Three of the youth are employed, and partially participate in project 
activities. The other three are students who only attend to project matters after school, during 
weekends, and school holidays (Daba interview, 2010a).  
In terms of their educational status, three of the members  possesses education within a scale of 
between grade 1 and grade 7, and five members possesses an educational level between grade 8 
to 12, and only two are at tertiary level. Four members have an income of less than R500 per 
month, two members have a monthly income of between R501 and R1000, and four members 
have an income of between R1001 and R2000. Their income is derived from formal jobs, 
business and a pension fund. They use the same funds to cover their project costs. The group is 
predominantly poor as the majorityof members are not attached to any formal income source.   
Some theorists like Borras (2003:371) indicates that land reform in many developing countries 
have shown that land is not necessarily distributed to people who could make productive use of 
the land or who were the most deserving on poverty grounds but rather to the politically 
powerful and well connected. However, the case of Lutendo Cooperatives proves that the poor 
are still accommodated within the redistribution of land. The beneficiaries of the project are the 
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ones who provide labour for all farm activities. However, as the need may arise, they intend to 
employ other important skills and labourers.  
 
5.2.5. Project ownership and management  
  
The group was registered as Lutendo Cooperatives with all members sharing an equal number of 
shares. This is despite the fact that other members were mobilized to gain access to the 
programme. As indicated by Mayson (2002:3), a broader understanding of collective and other 
cooperative ways in which farmers come together in groups to enhance their abilities in farming, 
was found to be necessary. Under the redistribution programme, beneficiaries choose a type of 
legal entity (Mogaswa interview, 2011).The cooperative has an established committee which is 
not functional (Daba interview, 2010b). This suggests that the establishment of the committee 
was done only to satisfy approval processes as operations are controlled by the founders of the 
project. 
 
Only five members are actively involved with the daily activities of the project. Others such as 
learners and students, and those who have permanent employment visit the project during 
weekends and school holidays. Members who live on the farm on a full time basis, all work 
together as a team. There are no special areas of production where each one is allocated. (Daba 
interview, 2010a).  
 
5.2.6. Land use production and management   
 
Lutendo Cooperative uses the property for both livestock and summer crop production. The farm 
was previously used for summer crop production such as maize and sunflowers. However, 
Lutendo has a limited understanding of the sunflower business (Daba interview, 2010b). Their 
major maize production was in 2009 when 132 hectares of maize were planted with the 
assistance of the neighbouring farmer. Mechanization for planting was provided by a 
neighbouring farmer.  
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The Cooperative is also rearing twenty-five beef cattle purchased through the RADP. The 
Provincial Shared Services Centre: Gauteng (PSSC: GP) commissioned a needs analysis 
assessment on PLAS farms and production inputs was on top of the list (DRDLR, 2010c). The 
exercise resulted in the release of R170 000 to selected active PLAS projects in Gauteng. The 
uniformity of the grant was to cover all projects within a limited budget for production (Manaka 
interview, 2011).   
 
5.2.7. Marketing 
 
The members of the cooperative send their maize to a miller which is 30km from the farm, and 
their cash crops are sold at an informal market. There are no formal contracts signed with any 
markets, although there are letters of intent from two agents (Daba interview, 2010a). These two 
potential markets are located at a radius of 30 km from the farm. Although the cooperative does 
not have its own transport, the members target hawkers in the nearby town (Daba interview, 
2010a).  
 
5.2.8. Training and extension services 
 
Two of the beneficiaries have been trained during their tenure at the municipal land. Their 
training includes land preparation, general farm management, crop production, harvesting, 
marketing, irrigation, tractor management, soil analysis, business management, bookkeeping, 
and pest control. Some of these training sessions have been facilitated by Gauteng Propeller 
Enterprise (GPE). GDARD exposed farmers to different role players for support (Manaka 
interview, 2011).  
 
The cooperative relies on GDARD for extension services. Extension officers are expected to  
advise on several production activities (Pakedi interview, 2010). In addition, the West Rand 
District Municipality (WDM) and the Randfontein Local Municipality also randomly visit the 
project. The project has also affiliated to the West Rand District Municipality Farmers’ Forum 
(WRDMFF) where they receive information on government intervention programmes. None of 
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the members of the cooperative are linked to a study group or a commodity association. The 
cooperative is largely dependent on extension services from GDARD. 
 
5.2.9. Conclusion   
 
Both Lutendo Community Project and Lutendo Cooperatives were influenced by government’s 
ideology to assist people as groups. In the first entity, the Daba families have been frustrated by 
including people with contrasting missions. However, the trend continued even in the current 
project. The vision of the Daba families continued to be shared with others even when it was not 
necessary to do so. When their application was sent to government, it was an LRAD application 
which later became a PLAS project. LRAD promoted the idea of group applications to cover the 
land purchase price. The dual implementation of LRAD and PLAS resulted in LRAD influencing 
the manner in which PLAS was handled. There was no system intended to prevent switching of 
projects from LRAD to PLAS.  In this case, the group model observed in SLAG and LRAD was 
found recurring even in the PLAS projects.  
 
5.3. Tenehi Project cc 
 
Items  Description  
Project name  Tenehi Project Close Corporation 
Property description   Portion 43, 44 and 45 of the Farm Hillside 
170IQ 
Number of hectares  25.6959 hectares 
Number of beneficiaries  5 
Purchase price  R1 500 000 
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5.3.1. Background 
 
The Tenehi project is located in the Tarlton area which is about 30km from Krugersdorp, Mogale 
City Municipality. The project was initiated by a woman who originated from Lesotho, who was 
inspired after watching a television programme in which government made a presentation 
regarding land reform programmes (Tenehi interview, 2010a). Her dream was to own a farm and 
to feed the nation. She consulted with the GDARD local office and was advised to look for 
additional members to increase the amount of the LRAD grant. The DSC would not recommend 
individual applications unless the applicant proves the ability to raise funds to supplement the 
grant (Mogaswa interview, 2011). Finally the group was composed of four women and one man, 
with three members of the group related to each other.  
 
Two members are from Lesotho and they have schooled together and they are related. The third 
member was met when the two relocated to Soweto, and the fourth member is from the Free 
State (Tenehi interview, 2010a).This group was composed of members who did not know each 
other too well. Some started to know each other because of this project endeavour.  
 
5.3.2. Social dominance, inequality and power 
 
Though the project had five members there is no evidence of formal meetings where 
beneficiaries engaged on project matters (Tenehi interview, 2010a). However, prior to settlement 
on the land, there was one dominant individual who was central to the formation of the group. 
The behavior of this beneficiary ultimately divided the group. As indicated by Steward (2009:67) 
social dominance within groups reinforces inequalities, and once these ideologies become self-
truths in society, it becomes easier for people to reinforce stereotypes.   
 
After settlement when three members moved to the farm, the dominant beneficiary opted to visit 
the farm on an ad hoc basis. The fifth beneficiary does not even know where the farm is because 
by the time it was transferred, she had already grappled with the dominant member and sulked 
(Tenehi interview, 2010b). The project was ultimately left with two beneficiaries who are related 
to the dominant member, while the dominant member continues to visit the farm occasionally.   
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5.3.3. Land identification and acquisition  
 
The process of land identification was initiated through contacts with estate agents and a 1.8 ha 
plot was initially identified, but was not recommended by the DSC. The DSC advised them to 
look for alternative land because a 1.8 ha plot was considered too small for government to 
purchase (DLA, 2008a). However, there is no standard guideline in relation to the magnitude of 
the land which should be purchased in land reform (Mogaswa interview, 2011). Officials were 
cautioned by the PGAC to balance the state investment with the number of hectares acquired 
(Mogaswa interview, 2011).  
 
Beneficiaries ultimately identified Portion 43, 44 and 45 of the Farm Hillside 170IQ, through the 
assistance of a government project officer. Project officers have more access to properties on 
sale, particularly from estate agents they worked with in previous transaction (Maleswene 
interview, 2011).Though the application was lodged as an LRAD project; it was later switched to 
PLAS. The applicants could not reach the purchase price through the grant, and had no means to 
raise the deficit (Mogaswa interview, 2011). The property was purchased at a valued amount of 
R1.5 million (DLA, 2008b). This suggests the reason for switching the application, from LRAD 
to PLAS which does not require applicants to mobilize a loan component. Officials considered 
any quick model which will result in land purchase due to pressure on delivering land, and PLAS 
proved to be convenient (Mogaswa interview, 2011). 
 
5.3.4. Lease agreement 
 
Tenehi Project signed a three years lease contract in February 2009. Even though they had not 
paid a rent of R72 000 per annum since occupation, the beneficiaries renewed the lease. This was 
despite section 8 of the lease agreement which states “Should the Lessee fail to pay the rental, 
interest shall be payable at the current interest rate per annum as determined by the Minister of 
Finance from time to time, in terms of section 80 of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 
(Act 1 of 1999). A certificate by the accounting section of the LESSOR shall be prima facie 
proof of such interest rate.” (DLA, 2007c). Though PLAS policy indicates that the property is 
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used on lease agreement, it does not provide for non-renewal on the basis of defaulted payments. 
Beneficiaries consider it impossible to service the lease contract without production (Tenehi 
interview, 2010b). 
 
It has been difficult for government to enforce repayments when there is limited to no production 
on PLAS farms (Mogaswa interview, 2011). Beneficiaries expect the land owner to fix all 
infrastructures, such as fencing, water supply, hydroponic tunnels, etc. This is in line with the 
PLAS policy which requires the state to make the farm farmable before a lessee occupies the 
farm (DLA, 2007c). Even though the first three years of occupation are characterized by non-
production, beneficiaries want the three-year lease period to be extended to attract investors 
(Tenehi interview, 2010a).  
 
5.3.5. Project ownership and management   
 
Since only two beneficiaries remained on the farm, operational decisions are taken by them. The 
two members who stay on the farm work randomly. However, administrative activities are done 
by the founder of the project (Tenehi interview, 2010b). The second beneficiary has experience 
in construction, and uses such skills for secondary income.  The fact that there is no constant 
production on the farm creates the constant unavailability of the second beneficiary. The 
unavailability of other members is ascribed, amongst others, to the lack of revenue. Lack of 
revenue on the farm compelled beneficiaries to survive through external means, though not 
enough to operate a farming enterprise. It is argued by McMillan et al (1992:80) that successful 
settlements depend on the cumulative results of decisions made by the settled, and those 
decisions result from their perception of risk opportunities and constraints and the extent to 
which their potential interests are promoted.  
 
5.3.6. Land use planning and management 
 
Through the assistance of GDARD in 2009, the project benefited from CASP by receiving three 
hydroponic tunnels and inputs of the first production cycle to the value of R900 000. Within 
these tunnels, they planted green peppers and tomatoes. In addition to crops, the Tenehi project is 
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rearing pigs as a secondary production option (Tenehi interview, 2010b). However, the property 
was mainly used for goat milk production as primary and secondary production included crops, 
piggery and pastures (Tenehi interview, 2010a).  
 
The project experienced extreme water shortages after the breaking of the borehole. As a result, 
they sold their pigs prematurely. The crop section was also highly affected because the planted 
commodities were highly dependent on water to survive. This led to an extreme disaster because 
over 90% of their crops died, resulting in a discontinuation of the tunnel production. This 
incident occurred when they had harvested and tested the market only twice, and they had 
already secured a few orders from the informal market. Both green pepper and tomato 
production was affected by this disaster. During the entire production period, it was only 
beneficiaries who provided labour. 
 
5.3.7. Marketing  
 
Since the primary production was intensive crop production, the marketing strategy targeted 
informal markets as a way of testing the market, but navigating formal contracts. There were 
informal markets in Krugersdorp and Magaliesburg where they sold some of the produce. The 
informal markets included workers of the surrounding farms whose workers were mostly placing 
orders of the produce (Tenehi interview, 2010b). This included farm dwellers of the surrounding 
farms. However, the strategy was compromised by the total collapse of production two weeks 
after the first harvest. At the time, an arrangement was made to supply a supermarket. Although 
negotiations were at an advanced stage, there was no formal contract entered with this market 
except verbal agreements (Tenehi interview, 2010a).  
 
5.3.8. Stakeholders’ engagement    
 
The project enjoyed support mainly from DRDLR, GDARD, ARC and Mogale City Local 
Municipality. The DRDLR has been assisting the project through a Recapitalization and 
Development grant to the value of R170 000 by 2010. The fund is focused on resolving the water 
supply predicament. The project also benefited in 2009 from the infrastructural grant from the 
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DRDLR and the fund was used for repairing the roof of the piggery house and for the fencing of 
the project.  
 
GDARD supplied the project with three hydroponic tunnels though CASP. The supply of this 
infrastructure included the production inputs for the first cycle of production.  GDARD 
continued to provide extension services to the project. This included taking farmers to the 
farmers’ days and other related farmers’ information sessions. GDARD also assisted in 
providing training to the project, particularly production related training (Tlale interview, 2010). 
Additionally, GDARD supplied the project with a poultry infrastructure with a capacity to 
produce 1000 birds. This structure has never been used since it was erected (Tenehi interview, 
2010b). The ARC provided similar advisory services as GDARD because they provided training 
to the project. The ARC’s training was more specific as it was directed at crop production in 
hydroponics. Meanwhile, Mogale City Municipality played a major role in supplying water to 
the project through their tankers (Maimane interview, 2011). This supply was however, meant 
mainly for human consumption and was not enough to sustain production. The supply of water to 
the farm by the municipality could not be sustainable due to the high demand of such services in 
other areas, and the municipality is not well resourced (Maimane interview, 2011). 
5.3.9. Infrastructure and mechanization   
 
In terms of the infrastructure, the property is located 10km from the tarred road which connects 
the towns of Krugersdorp and Magaliesburg. The gravel road that leads to the project is well 
maintained. This benefit is due to the farm’s closeness to the Early Bird Farm which is one of the 
largest poultry producers. Internally the farm has a house, storage facility and a piggery 
structure. In addition, the project benefited from CASP because they received three hydroponic 
tunnels and one broiler structure with a capacity to accommodate 1000 birds. Moreover, the 
project also benefited from the PLAS Infrastructural Grant of R45000 in 2008, which assisted in 
repairing the roof of the piggery structure and provided for the maintenance of the border fence.  
 
The farm has eight boreholes, but the water table is very low, and there is generally less 
underground water in the area (Mogaswa interview, 2011). Although the project has electricity, 
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the cost of maintenance is high. The project does not have any mechanical implements. Their 
production is very labour- intensive, i.e. crops, piggery and poultry.  
 
5.3.10. Conclusion 
 
The Tenehi project is driven by an individual who has been struggling to bring the best out of 
their allocated farm. This beneficiary initiated the project and continued to pursue the idea, 
despite the withdrawal of other members. However, their absence stalled negotiations which 
required the involvement of all members as per the lease agreement. In this case, there is a 
recurrence of the principles of the SLAG and LRAD models, where groups were formed to 
satisfy approval processes, yet were problematic in business matters.  
 
The situation is influenced by the concurrent implementation of both PLAS and LRAD without a 
clear distinction between the two. The policy documents present two different models of 
beneficiary selection - while LRAD is open-ended, PLAS is controlled through the BSC. This 
confirms tendencies of applications being switched from LRAD to PLAS because officials 
should meet delivery targets using either of the two delivery models. The purchase of this land 
through PLAS saved beneficiaries from the process of applying for loans from the bank to 
supplement the LRAD grant.  
This project enjoyed support from the national, provincial, and local government, as well as the 
public entities. However, this support is not within an integrated plan which addresses the 
immediate challenges of the project. This support is viewed in this study as individualistic 
interventions which ignore important elements of intervention. Water supply could have been 
prioritized before the construction of broiler houses.  
PLAS policy dictates that land is identified, acquired and warehoused by the state, without any 
beneficiary attached with the view that the property would first be equipped with relevant 
infrastructures. When this process is compromised, beneficiaries are confronted with dual 
financial needs, i.e. operations and development. The policy does not indicate the developmental 
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responsibilities of the land owner after the property has been allocated.  This study views this 
preparatory inadequacy as a recipe for setting up beneficiaries for failure. 
 
5.4. Setholoa Project cc 
  
Items  Description  
Project name  Setholoa Close Corporation  
Property description  Portion 49 (Portion of Portion 2) of the Farm 
Weltevreden 517 JQ 
Number of hectares  23. 4494 hectares 
Number of beneficiaries  2 
Purchase price  R4 000 000 
 
5.4.1. Background 
 
The Setholoa project was initiated by two women with the intention to produce broilers in 
Portion 49 (Portion of Portion 2) of the Farm Weltevreden 517 JQ farm in the Hekpoort area, 
Mogale City Municipality. The plan to farm started in 2006 when Nthabiseng Thupana wanted to 
start her own farming business. This beneficiary had been employed by the Gauteng Department 
of Education for eight years, three years in finance and five years in human resources. She 
resigned in 2007 to pursue her business aspirations. The second beneficiary was Nosipho who 
was an unemployed housewife who depended on her husband for their livelihood. 
 
The beneficiary gathered from other farmers that government does not assist individuals in land 
acquisition, but groups of people who intend to work together and better their lives. Although 
government does not have a policy which denies individuals assistance, the manner in which 
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SLAG and LRAD funding was structured perpetuated this public view (Manaka interview, 
2011). 
Although the main beneficiary preferred to farm alone, she partnered with Nosipho who is a 
spouse of her former colleague and they registered a Close Cooperation (Thupana interview, 
2010a). Although government prescribed a Communal Property Association (CPA) as a 
preferred legal entity, particularly on restitution projects, there is flexibility in redistribution 
matters (Mogaswa interview, 2011).  
The beneficiaries occupied Portion 49 (Portion of Portion 2) of the Farm Weltevreden 517 JQ in 
2007 immediately after the land was purchased. It is required that beneficiaries move to the farm 
immediately after registration to avoid vandalism (Mogaswa interview, 2011). Nosipho was 
pregnant when they occupied the farm (Thupana interview, 2010a). She left the farm for 
maternity purposes two months later and had not returned. They have known each other for less 
than two years. There is no prescription of how long beneficiaries should know each other or for 
what period they had been doing business together (Maleswene interview, 2012).  
 
5.4.2. Land identification and acquisition 
 
Nthabiseng had been living in a 5.5ha plot she and her husband purchased in 2007. Unlike under 
LRAD where a private property was considered as own contribution when linked to a new 
property, PLAS does not provide such benefits (Mogaswa interview, 2011).  Nthabiseng 
approached estate agents who claimed to be a link to government for land purchases and they 
promised to assist with her application. There have been cases of scams where individuals and 
companies claimed to assist applicants with land reform applications and individuals lose money 
in the process and ultimately get no land (Manaka interview, 2011). Nthabiseng was saved by a 
departmental official whom she approached after she had paid admin fees to the estate agents. 
 
Nthabiseng was informed of the sale of Portion 49 (portion of portion 2) of the farm Weltevreden 
517 JQ when she visited GDARD for information (Thupana interview, 2010a). She was 
desperately looking for a farm. She even voluntarily participated in the price negotiations of the 
farm. The asking price of the property was R6 500 000, but it was purchased for R4 000 000. 
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Some beneficiaries are proactive to the extent that they are involved in every phase of the 
application (Mogaswa interview, 2011).  
 
5.4.3. Lease contract management 
 
The property was purchased for R4 000 000 and the lessee was expected to pay an annual lease 
amount of R240 000 per annum. Even though the business ran for two years, the beneficiary 
claims not to have made any profit which could allow her to service her lease agreement. There 
are no systems which assist government to track beneficiaries’ business income and expenditure 
(Maponya interview, 2010).   
 
Although the first lease agreement was not fulfilled, it was renewed. That was despite section 8 
of the lease agreement which states, “Should the Lessee fail to pay the rental, interest shall be 
payable at the current interest rate per annum as determined by the Minister of Finance from time 
to time, in terms of section 80 of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act 1 of 1999). A 
certificate by the accounting section of the LESSOR shall be prima facie proof of such interest 
rate.” (DLA, 2007d). There is no clause in the new agreement which addresses what was not 
paid in the previous agreement. Accordingly PLAS farmers are afforded a second chance with a 
boost of the Recapitalization and Development Programme (Mogaswa interview, 2011). This 
renewal suggests that the three years’ debt of R720 000 is nullified, and the project will be 
recapitalized. The project officer also sympathized with beneficiaries on the lack of production, 
but was encouraged when RDP was introduced (Keameditse interview, 2013).  
The beneficiary had preferred to purchase the property so that she could secure production 
capital through using land as collateral. However, the ownership of the land remains with the 
state. This aspiration suggests unwillingness to pay the rent and government investment through 
the RADP endorses the view that government does not want to release the land (Thupana 
interview, 2010b).  
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5.4.4. Project management, administration and operations 
 
The project management structure identifies Nthabiseng as a Director of the business, with 
Nosipho as a Financial Manager. Other members included a Farm Manager and two Supervisors 
who were alternating between day and night shifts, and eleven workers. The workers were 
inherited from the previous owner as the property was sold as a going concern. All employees 
had been farm workers for over five years and they are familiar with operations. The salaries of 
the staff ranged between R950 and R4 000 per month. The project also hosted Poultry Science 
students from the University of North West for practical experience.   
 
The project has been reliant on assistance from Nthabiseng’s husband who runs a consulting and 
taxi business. This arrangement put a strain on their household budget and it was no longer 
feasible to continue using the household budget for the support of the business (Thupana 
interview, 2010a). Her husband ultimately withdrew support to the project (Thupana interview, 
2010a).  
The project was receiving chicks and production inputs such as feeds from their strategic partner, 
Sangiro Group. Beneficiaries incurred limited costs towards production inputs. The 
beneficiaries’ contractual obligation included preparation of poultry houses and maintenance of 
the equipment. Government was not involved in the negotiations of the contractual terms and 
benefits (Mogaswa interview, 2011).  
 
5.4.5. Relational dynamics 
 
The cooperation between the two beneficiaries was short-lived as one left the farm for maternity 
purposes and never returned. Unfortunately, there is no established process aimed at adjudicating 
differences between beneficiaries unlike in CPAs where government is compelled to intervene 
(Mogaswa interview, 2011).  Manenzhe (2007:29) also identified lack of post-settlement support 
as a critical issue which may undermine the development goal of land reform. According to 
Manenzhe (2007:29) a comprehensive integrated programme of land reform is imperative to 
realize the benefits of land reform objectives. The plan can also help to protect beneficiaries from 
social dominance by other members.  
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5.4.6. Land use planning and production  
 
Portion 49 (Portion of Portion 2) of the Farm Weltevreden 517 JQ is a 24 ha unit with over 85% 
of the land categorized as rocky and not suitable for any crop production. The previous owner 
used the land specifically for broiler production, which is what the beneficiaries continued with. 
The property has six poultry houses, each having a capacity to accommodate 17 000 birds. When 
beneficiaries occupied the farm, they carried over the contract which was in place for the 
previous owner and they serviced the contract for two years at an average production of 102 000 
birds every two weeks. There should have been a risk assessment conducted before the contract 
was inherited from the previous owner (Thupana interview, 2010b).   
 
After the collapse of the poultry business, which she decided to shut down with the hope of 
finding a better poultry market deal, the beneficiary explored intensive sheep production. The 
collapse of that business resulted in the retrenchment of all employees. The retrenchment 
conflicted with the objectives of the land reform programme, namely production and job 
creation. This confirms the argument by Anseeuw and Mathebula (2008) that the land reform 
programme has caused an 89.5% decrease in production as well as many job losses.    
 
5.4.7. Training and extension services 
 
There is no formal training received by beneficiaries on broiler production (Thupana interview, 
2010a). The remaining beneficiary affiliated to a study group which deals with poultry 
management. The study group invites specialists to advise on feeding, medication, diseases, 
latest technologies, etc. The beneficiary also benefited from Farm Management training offered 
by the Agricultural Research Council. The workers were mostly trained within the farm at 
proactive and reactive sessions provided by the strategic partner. Though GDARD consistently 
visited the project, their extension services were limited because most of the production 
information was prescribed and acquired from Sangiro (Thupana interview, 2010a).  
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5.4.8. Marketing 
 
The contract with the Sangiro group was characterized by several challenges, and the collapse in 
production was ascribed to the same contract (Thupana interview, 2010b). It is alleged that the 
contract protected the Sangiro group more than the growers. The growers were responsible for 
supplying all preparatory inputs such as sawdust, cleaning materials, coal, etc. while the Sangiro 
group was responsible for supplying day-old chicks, medication, transport and feeds. However, 
these cost where deducted from the returns of the project. It is alleged that the Sangiro group 
would deliver more than the required feeds, and this had cost implications in terms of how the 
project should benefit in return.     
 
The price that the Sangiro group was offering was R9.20 per kg per chicken and birds were sold 
at a weight of between 1.6kg-1.7kg. Sangiro would delay in delivering the feeds to the project 
and this created weight challenges to the birds, and that ultimately affected the returns to 
beneficiaries. It is indicated that there were times were the project was experiencing a high 
mortality rate which led to the beneficiary seeking advice from a private veterinarian (Thupana 
interview, 2010a). However, the Sangiro group declined the recommendations by the private 
veterinarian. This ultimately led to beneficiaries continuing to incur costs related to vaccines and 
other remedial necessities. The Setholoa project settled these costs to avoid a high mortality rate, 
as any drop in production meant a major drop in their returns.  
 
The drop in production in early 2008 and the reluctance of the Sangiro group to assist in the 
process resulted into Setholoa seeking legal advice from lawyers. However, there was very little 
that could be done to correct the situation. During the purchase of the farm, although the 
government remained the owner, the screening of the contract concentrated on the legalities, but 
not on the benefits of the beneficiaries. There was general excitement when the property was 
purchased with a market readily available, but a proper understanding of the contents and 
obligations of the contract was lacking (Mogaswa interview, March 2011).  
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5.4.9. Infrastructural development and mechanization  
 
The available infrastructure required constant maintenance to meet the standards of the market 
(Thupana interview, 2010a). The project experienced a borehole breakdown and this threatened 
the stock which was in place. The DRDLR also released an amount of R91 000 which was used 
for the erection of a fence. Apart from this, the projects had not benefited from any other support 
from either the government or private institutions. During her occupation, the beneficiary bought 
her own working tools and means of transport.  
 
5.4.10. Conclusion 
 
The project was purchased with an advantage of experienced personnel and a well-established 
human resource structure. This advantage had the potential to grow the project beyond where it 
was found. The potential could have unfolded well if there was proper support provided to the 
beneficiary. However, the project lacked business skills to drive it beyond where it was. When 
the property was purchased with a contract of supply in place, there was no thorough 
investigation into the sustainability of the project given the rates that the market provided. This 
raises a question about the extent to which projects are screened during the approval processes, 
considering that approval structures are composed of experts from different fields. 
 
5.5. Conclusions 
 
Since PLAS was implemented within the same land redistribution framework which gave birth 
to redistribution programmes such as SLAG, LRAD and other redistribution models, it equally 
experienced a fair share of challenges, as experienced by its predecessors. Firstly, it was 
established under the framework of the “willing buyer, willing seller” model of redistribution. 
The case studies show that although the state was a willing buyer, willing sellers were not readily 
guaranteed. The time spent searching for a farm explains the dynamics faced by land reform 
applicants looking to buy a farm. Secondly, the state of underdevelopment of the occupied farms 
raises questions about the type and quality of land available for land reform. The introduction of 
PLAS did not expand the market opportunities for land reform, such as accessing land through 
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auctions. The continuation of bureaucratic processes of purchasing the property placed 
government as a willing, but passive buyer in the market which is open to everyone.      
 
The case studies also display an inheritance of group projects which were perpetuated by the 
grant models of land reform. The dual implementation of LRAD and PLAS resulted in officials 
switching applications from LRAD to PLAS to suit delivery targets. If applicants had to form a 
group of ten members, it was assumed that the target was to match the LRAD grant. However, 
when applicants proved to be incapable of raising additional capital, an official would then 
switch the application to PLAS to avoid losing the project. The Lutendo Cooperative and the 
Tenehi projects were initiated as LRAD projects and were later switched to PLAS.  This means 
that PLAS was used as a scapegoat from the frustration of inadequate capital for land purchase 
through LRAD. The officials’ performance is the number of hectares transferred, whether under 
LRAD or PLAS. 
 
There hasn’t been a particular system that government put in place to assist beneficiaries to 
honour their lease obligation. The projects were running for an average of three years without 
beneficiaries paying anything, yet the contracts were renewed. It is not clear what guarantees the 
government has that the second round of the contract will yield a positive response. The 6% 
rental on the purchase price per annum is irrelevant if the scale of production does not match the 
purchase price. 
Applicants continued to identify land and there was a sense of entitlement to land until the 
transfer processes were complete. In the end, government’s purpose of allocating suitable land to 
beneficiaries was compromised, since land is allocated to those who identified it. This study 
suggests that government did not have a tool to identify land and to acquire it without any 
applicant attached. This is despite the requirements of PLAS to target strategically-located land.  
PLAS requires that government makes the farm farmable as soon as the land is acquired so that 
the beneficiaries would not suffer. In the case of the Lutendo Cooperative, the cooperative 
depended on the neighboring commercial farmer for implements and mechanization. The Tenehi 
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project had to endure an inferior infrastructure throughout the term of the lease agreement. The 
prescription of preparing farms prior to settlement was not realized in the early days of PLAS.  
Under LRAD, where projects had a loan component, repayments were attached to a fixed term 
and the repayment of such a loan would come to an end when the beneficiary finishes repaying. 
Under PLAS, rental payments are continuous as long as the beneficiary continues to lease the 
land. Given the above, PLAS is viewed as an expensive model for beneficiaries. LRAD 
repayments were calculated based on the loan amount, repayment terms and affordability of the 
debtor, but PLAS repayment is determined by the blanket 6% on the purchase price.      
This study found that the long term implication of the non-payment of the obligations under a 
lease contract has been ignored. The lease contract remains a legal document which the state 
could use to demand revenue. The eagerness of beneficiaries to get land prevents them from 
interrogating the implications of not honouring the requirements of the lease agreement. The 
perception is that government knows that there is no production and as a result the state should 
not demand any payment. However, all state debtors should be handled in the same way as 
stipulated in the government policies (Maponya interview, March 2010). The complexity of land 
reform presents a moral challenge to the state, that although policy requires universal debt 
collection, the reality on the ground point in in a different direction.  
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CHAPTER 6: KEY FINDINGS 
 
6.1. Introduction  
 
PLAS has been implemented under a land redistribution programme whose purpose is to provide 
the poor with land for residential and productive purposes in order to improve their livelihoods 
(DLA, 1997). This programme targets previously disadvantaged South African citizens including 
the urban and rural poor, farm workers, labour tenants, as well as emergent farmers (DLA, 
1997). The implementation of the redistribution programme is guided by the ‘willing seller, 
willing buyer’ principles which have been highly criticized for its hindrance to speedy land 
delivery (DLA, 2005).  
 
PLAS was preceded by both SLAG and LRAD which were all grant-based models. Both 
programmes have been viewed as demand-led models, where land is identified by applicants, 
while the state awaits the efforts by applicants (Lahiff (2007a: 2). In this view, the government 
was criticized for not driving the land redistribution programme (DLA, 2005). 
PLAS was introduced to bridge the gap of state driven or supply-led driven land redistribution 
wherein land was made available through applicants initiatives of searching for land to a state 
driven redistribution where the state acquire and distribute to the beneficiaries.  In this model, the 
government would acquire land, prepare it, and then make it available to prospective farmers 
after a screening process (DLA, 2006a:18). In cases where such farmers prove to be productive, 
the land would ultimately be transferred to them. However, the privatization of land acquired 
through PLAS was suspended in 2009, when all redistribution programmes were suspended by 
the Minister of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR, 2009c:1).  
 
6.2. Land delivery   
 
When PLAS was introduced towards the end of 2006, government had only transferred 3% on its 
2014 target of redistributing 30% of white owned agricultural land (DLA, 2005). In the first two 
years of its existence in Gauteng, PLAS proved to be a potentially viable model of land delivery. 
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Within that period, over 20 000ha were transferred through PLAS, while other redistribution 
programmes could not match such an outstanding performance in the history of Gauteng land 
reform. Accordingly, the transfer also included properties where beneficiaries were struggling to 
secure capital as ‘own contribution’, some of whom have been there for a longer period 
(Mogaswa interview, 2011).  
 
During LRAD implementation, land acquisition deals were forfeited because beneficiaries could 
not raise additional capital to supplement the grants. The extent of time spent securing such 
capital could not allow most land owners to wait until applicants acquired capital. As a result, 
offers to purchase would elapse, and ‘willing sellers’ withdrew their land from the state market 
and ultimately sold it privately (Manaka interview, 2011). However, PLAS displayed the 
potential to unlock such challenges because upon agreement of the price negotiations, the 
process of ownership transfer would start immediately, unlike under LRAD were applicants were 
required, in most cases, to produce their own contribution before transfer could be initiated.  
Most of the transactions that were deadlocked due to the lack of additional capital were therefore 
revived and purchased through PLAS. 
This rapid land delivery programme was later dropped in 2008 because of a number of reasons. 
According to Malesela Manaka, the Director: Land Reform (Manaka interview, 2011) as PLAS 
continued to be implemented, the state started carrying the responsibility of the lease 
administration of all land acquired through PLAS. The DRDLR did not have the capacity to 
provide immediate support to PLAS beneficiaries and simultaneously continue to acquire land at 
the same pace. Secondly, DRDLR started to receive qualified audit reports on PLAS which 
contributed in cautioning officials in terms of how land should be acquired. The report identified 
inconsistencies in the support provided to individual projects such as percentages of the 
infrastructure development grant, the dilapidation of purchased machinery, and beneficiaries 
leasing properties without a lease agreement (DRDLR, 2009b). Even though the quality of the 
PLAS performance dropped drastically in Gauteng, its first two years of existence proved to be a 
potentially viable land acquisition model which could accelerate land delivery. The case studies 
of the Lutendo Cooperative and the Tenehi Project cc show that beneficiaries would not be able 
to afford the cost of their land, had they continued to buy through LRAD.  
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6.3. Land identification process 
 
The introduction of PLAS afforded the government an opportunity to implement a supply-led 
approach as opposed to the demand-led approaches of both SLAG and LRAD. As indicated in 
the resolutions of the National Land Summit (DLA, 2005), the government had to provide an 
alternative to the LRAD so as to accelerate the delivery of land. However, this study reveals that 
even though PLAS is a supply-led model, it has been implemented as a demand-led model as all 
properties were identified by the applicants themselves, and the allocations were based on who 
identified the land, rather than the compatibility of the land with the resources of the applicants. 
Accordingly, PLAS beneficiaries should be identified based on their potential to use the land 
productively (DLA, 2006b:18). 
  
According to Version 1 of the PLAS manual, it is indicated that the strategy would identify land 
in three distinctive areas (DLA, 2006b:10). Firstly, PLAS aims to acquire land in nodal areas 
which were declared by the 2001 Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme 
(ISRDP) which confirmed certain areas as rural nodes where efforts should be focused for 
development. Secondly, PLAS strives to acquire land along the identified agricultural corridors 
as areas where there are vibrant economic activities. Thirdly, PLAS intends to acquire land in 
areas with high agricultural potential such as agricultural hubs. These objectives proved to be 
unachievable when land identification is controlled externally by the market and the applicants.   
Notwithstanding this particular focus on where land should be acquired, the Gauteng PLRO did 
not have a tool which assists to identify land. The province has since struggled to develop an 
Area Based Plan (ABP) which later changed to become the Rural Development and Land 
Reform Plan (RDLRP). One of the objectives of this tool is to identify strategically located land 
where land reform efforts can be focused. However, GDARD developed an Agricultural Hub 
study which declared several areas around the province as agricultural hubs in the Gauteng 
Province (GDARD, 2007).   
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Figure 6.1. Gauteng Agricultural Hubs (GDARD, 2007) 
  
The study identified seven agricultural hubs in Gauteng with a total size of 605 750ha which 
represent 36% of the total surface area of the province (1 689 079 ha). Three agricultural hubs 
are in the Sedibeng District Municipality, two and a half in the Metsweding District 
Municipality, one in the West Rand District Municipality, and one in the Ekurhuleni 
Metropolitan Municipality (GDARD, 2007). An agricultural hub is defined as an agricultural 
development node that is characterized by large amounts of High Potential Agriculture Land 
(HPAL) necessary for protection and to be managed as a holistic agriculture unit (GDARD, 
2007:5). The Agriculture Hubs Development Programme (AHDP) is a commercially-focused 
agricultural development programme with a spatial plan for present and future agricultural 
development in Gauteng. The main goal of agricultural hubs is to preserve, protect and enhance 
economically viable agricultural land in the province, particularly on HPAL. It is informed by 
the Gauteng Agriculture Development Strategy (GADS) which was developed in 2005 and 
launched in February 2006. GADS pillars include natural agricultural resource protection, 
enhancing the competitiveness of the sector, farmer development and support, partnership 
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formation and maintenance (intra and extra governmental) as well as emancipation of vulnerable 
groups (GDARD, 2007:5).  
Even though GDARD launched the GADS in 2006 and developed the AHDP in 2007, this study 
did not identify the link between the strategy and the manner in which the three case studies were 
identified. The case studies confirm that land continued to be identified in the same manner as 
LRAD and SLAG. This was despite the fact that PLAS is a supply-driven model. This study 
perceives that the concurrent implementation of LRAD and PLAS compromised the land 
identification process as articulated in the PLAS strategy. Officials were comfortable to continue 
implementing PLAS through LRAD systems of land identification.  
 
6.4. Beneficiary identification and selection  
 
The case studies identified trends towards ‘one-person’ projects, even though beneficiaries were 
initially more than one. The trend is that some members would be pushed away by the dominant 
members as seen in the case of the Tenehi Project cc and the Setholoa cc. There is no tool 
designed to protect beneficiaries from losing the benefits acquired through land reform. This 
trend suggests that the number of beneficiaries in land reform projects decrease over time. As a 
result, benefits are therefore reaped by a few. Officials influenced applicants to mobilise 
additional members even when the system did not demand that increase. The recruited members 
are the ones who fall victims of being pushed away. Ultimately, in practice, the projects become 
a one-person project. This practice continues to perpetuate the ‘rent a crowd’ pattern of the past 
as asserted by Hall (2010b:83). The case studies indicate that there is limited to non-participation 
of other beneficiaries of the projects.  
 
Both PLAS predecessors, i.e. SLAG and LRAD have been under criticism for creating a 
mismatch between beneficiaries and the land they are allocated (Lahiff, 2007b:13). PLAS 
created a facility whereby beneficiaries would be thoroughly screened before they were settled 
on a farm. The screening process provides the state with an opportunity to influence the process 
of determining who should benefit from which land. This model is different from other 
redistribution tools where land was identified by applicants and government allocated such land 
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to those who identified it, despite the mismatch between applicants and land. With LRAD having 
established approval structures in progress, PLAS was adapted to the same approval processes, 
but the focus remained on production viability, with a limited focus on who should benefit from 
the land. The case studies show that projects where subjected to approval structures, but none 
were subject to a beneficiary selection process. 
 
6.5. Beneficiaries’ contribution and commitment 
 
In LRAD, a clear indication in terms of how applicants would access the grant for land purchase 
is provided (DLA, 2001:3). Applicants must provide their own contribution in the form of 
labour, kind and finances. A combination of these three categories would determine the size of 
the grant each individual would qualify for. However, PLAS beneficiaries were not subjected to 
any form of ownership. Accordingly, the framework in terms of the strategy seeks to target black 
people (Africans, Coloureds and Indians), groups that live in communal areas, black people with 
the necessary farming skills in urban areas, and people living under insecure tenure rights (DLA, 
2006a:10). In this way the framework seeks to contribute to the decongestion of the communal 
areas, to secure on or off farm accommodation and to create sustainable livelihoods (DLA, 
2006a:10). While the approach is pro-poor, it also caters for emergent and commercial farmers 
(DLA, 2006a:10). 
 
The case studies identified that farms like the Lutendo Cooperative and the Setholoa cc have 
been operating commercially prior to their purchase, but after purchase, beneficiaries became 
over-reliant on assistance from the government. The view of this study is that if applicants were 
identified and selected with a consideration of their resources in terms of skills and capital, a 
clear distinction would have been drawn in terms of which land could be allocated for which 
group of applicants. In this view, subsistence farmers would not be viewed as failures, had they 
been allocated suitable land according to their resources.    
Despite the fact that it was not PLAS’s requirement to profile applicants’ contributions, the level 
of commitment and availability displayed by beneficiaries, can be measured against the labour 
contribution which was recognized under LRAD. Furthermore, some beneficiaries bought 
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implements, vehicles and cattle, which could be viewed as contribution in kind under LRAD. 
Their personal financial support for production resembled their contribution to the development 
of the project.  
In all three case studies there were beneficiaries who were living and working on the farms full-
time. However, there were other beneficiaries who were part-time, and to a large extent visitors, 
on their allocated land. The departmental PLAS audit revealed that there were farms which were 
deserted and abandoned by beneficiaries, leaving them in the hands of their workers (DRDLR, 
2009b). However, in all three case studies, respondents confirmed that they did not have any 
other residence except on the farm. 
 
6.6. Land use planning and production 
 
All case studies confirmed that feasibility studies and/ or project management plans were 
developed so that the application would be approved by the PGAC. The implementation of the 
approved plans could not be confirmed in all case studies, except in the Setholoa project where 
the plan incorporated the existing market. The constant changes in production commodities 
suggest that there is no attachment to the approved plan, and there is no enforcement of the 
approved plan by the state.  
 
Even though the production recorded in the case studies displayed difficulties, beneficiaries are 
still determined to make it work. There is enthusiasm and hope to continue with production 
irrespective of the challenges. Much of the current optimism is also influenced by the recent 
announcement by government to provide support through the Recapitalization and Development 
Programme (RADP). All case studies confirmed that they are likely to be benefit from the 
RADP. However, there is a process which needs to be followed which includes the identification 
of a strategic partner by the beneficiaries or through the assistance of the relevant department.  
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6.7. Caretaking and lease agreement     
  
In terms of this strategy, it is a recommended that before a lessee is awarded a rental contract, the 
land should be handed to a caretaker who would take care of the property for twelve months, 
without an option to purchase. During this period, the state would have an opportunity to make 
the land farmable by providing all necessary equipment, infrastructure, and mechanization on the 
farm. However, all case studies confirmed that the current occupiers are the only people who 
ever occupied those properties. This suggests that no caretaker-ship agreement was signed prior 
to the signing of the lease agreements, and that there was no programme of making the farm 
farmable before settlement of the lessee.  
 
Although the strategy recommended that a lease agreement should be linked to one production 
cycle (DLA, 2006a), the signed lease agreements were for a three-year period. This is despite the 
PLAS policy which advocates that the lease period must be linked to one production cycle of the 
enterprise that the beneficiaries are engaged in (DLA, 2006a:8). The lease agreements were 
designed as blanket contracts which are not based on the type of commodity to be produced. 
This oversight was extended to the manner in which the lease amount was calculated. PLAS 
beneficiaries are expected to service their lease agreements through an annual payment of 6% of 
the purchase price of the property. The purchase price of the property is based on the market 
value of the property, but not on the production value of the land. In all case studies, none of 
them have paid any amounts towards their lease agreements. This is despite the fact that they 
have all been producing in one way or the other.   
The strategy makes provision for the option to purchase the property after an assessment. When 
the strategy was reviewed in 2009, the option to purchase was withdrawn, leaving the 
government as the indefinite land owner (DRDLR, 2009c). This study views this withdrawal as 
an investment threat to beneficiaries, since they are reluctant to develop land which could be 
handed to other beneficiaries. As a result, PLAS beneficiaries are rendered highly dependent on 
the government for the land development and support. Furthermore, beneficiaries allege that they 
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have been missing investment opportunities because they do not own the land, and that their 
lease agreement is too short for an investor to make a commitment.  
 
6.8. Conclusion  
 
The introduction of PLAS brought significant assistance in the Gauteng province because land 
delivery increased.  However, the institutional arrangement of DRDLR could not cope with 
continuous land acquisition and maintenance of the acquired land. The extent of support 
provided by the state to PLAS beneficiaries was structured to a value of 25% of the purchased 
price of the land, which was different from what was provided in other redistribution models 
which depended on the balance of the grant.  
 
PLAS proved to have the potential to resolve some of the LRAD challenges, such as the inability 
of applicants to secure supplementary capital to purchase land. The trend observed from the case 
studies whereby applicants continue to identify land on their own, potentially compromises the 
supply-led objectives of PLAS. When some land is ultimately acquired, officials naturally 
allocate the land to those who have identified it even when the applicants are less resourced to 
effectively produce on that land. The case studies confirmed that beneficiaries are more 
dependent on state assistance. This trend has been observed in the other redistribution models; 
hence the allocation through state intervention came as a new model. The introduction of 
beneficiary selection processes was considered by officials as an add-on to the approval 
processes which were there before PLAS was introduced.  
The research identified that beneficiaries will continue to be dependent on the state if the lease 
periods are not adjusted to fit production circles of different commodities. The short term lease 
agreements create an environment whereby beneficiaries continue to depend on the state for 
support, while they could have secured such support from either private investors or financial 
institutions.    
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS  
 
Redistributive land reform as the basis on which PLAS was established, has been crafted by the 
World Bank for reducing poverty and inequality and it confirms the link between unequal land 
distribution and conflict. The implementation of PLAS was not supported by a tool which seeks 
to identify, target and confirm the poor amongst other participants, unlike in the case of SLAG 
where emphasis was placed on households with less income.  
 
However, the implementation of PLAS demonstrated positive results in terms of land delivery. If 
this delivery is maintained, PLAS can speed up the process of transferring more land from the 
white owned commercial farmers to a system which allows the previously disadvantaged to have 
more access to land. This model resolves the bureaucratic barriers experienced when applicants 
for land redistribution had to raise capital to supplement the land purchase grant. The case 
studies confirm that these properties would not have been afforded by the same beneficiaries, 
had they been acquired through LRAD. The socio-economic status of the leasing beneficiaries is 
such that they could not have succeeded to secure capital to supplement the land purchase grant.  
This study identified that there is a lack of a strategic approach to land identification. Project 
officers rely on sellers to supply land with prescriptions of which land should be purchased, 
which areas should be targeted, and which commodities should be promoted. This is despite the 
indication by PLAS that land acquisition must be executed within the ambit of local/district 
level, IDP processes or an area-based planning approach (DLA, 2006a:11). In this case, the 
government needs not wait for estate agents or applicants to approach them, but should drive the 
process of identifying and determining land needs, select appropriate beneficiaries and identify 
suitable land. Municipalities, together with  local/district agriculture offices may actively identify 
land and beneficiaries, and then approach the DRDLR for funding assistance for planning and 
land acquisitions (DLA, 2006a:11).  
There was no clear approach on how DRDLR will identify land since PLAS is a supply-led 
approach without the completion of ABP. In this case, DRDLR depended on the market to 
present the available land without driving the process. The same approach was identified during 
the SLAG and LRAD implementation. It is the view of this study that all government support to 
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land reform should be well coordinated, in the form of project-integrated plans, by all spheres of 
government, to address the relevant needs. 
The study also identified unclear matching of beneficiaries to land. When farmers are allocated a 
commercial enterprise, while their resources envisage them as subsistence farmers, failure can be 
forecast even before occupation of the farm. When farmers are entirely dependent on 
government support as the sole source of capital, sustainability of such enterprises cannot be 
guaranteed. All beneficiaries on the case studies blamed government for their slow progress in 
production. This is despite the beneficiaries’ inability to account for the revenue collected while 
the farms were operational.  
The continuous purchasing of land without disposing of it, as it is currently, created 
administrative nightmares. The case studies show that DRDLR has been struggling to properly 
administer lease agreements. The capacity of the PLRO to facilitate the purchase and monitor the 
acquired land remained the same. As a result of this dual operation, project officers concentrated 
on attending to purchased farms, and land purchase automatically went down drastically. 
When beneficiaries are not certain about who will ultimately own the land, it threatens their 
investments on the property, and similarly creates over-dependence on the state by the 
beneficiaries. It is obvious from the case studies that beneficiaries were basically dependent on 
the government, not only for infrastructural development and maintenance, but also for 
production capital. Accordingly, beneficiaries view this as a limitation in PLAS and blame the 
government for not transferring the land to them.  
The lease arrangement as compared to private ownership provides the government with an 
opportunity to lease the property to other beneficiaries if the current beneficiaries are no longer 
interested in farming. However, this is likely to create resistance if the current lessee made 
substantial investments on the land. Beneficiaries in the case studies were producing and aiming 
to produce different unrelated commodities, but they all had three-year contracts.  
With regard to the first PLAS objective of accelerating land redistribution process, the first two 
years of its implementation in Gauteng confirmed that PLAS has the potential to speed up the 
delivery of land. Even though PLAS intended to acquire land in nodal areas and in the identified 
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agricultural corridors and other areas of high agricultural potential, the study identified that there 
was no plan or strategy to target land for purchase. Considering the third objective of improving 
the identification and selection of beneficiaries and the planning of land, the study identified that 
a system, in the form of a BSC, was established. However, the study identified that the 
government continued to guide the composition of the group in terms of the number of people 
within a group, and the mismatch between land and beneficiaries continued.  
Given the dimensions of time, quality and quantity in the process of accessing the land, it is clear 
that land reform programmes based on the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ approach cannot 
distribute land overnight. Secondly, although the state is a ‘willing buyer’ who can acquire land 
much faster, there are limitations linked to MBLR, on which redistributive land reform is based 
in South Africa. The study identified that although the willing buyer is capable of acquiring the 
land, the willing sellers’ availability is not guaranteed. When the land is available to the market, 
the state does not have the first preference to buy, and therefore competes with the private sector, 
whose duration of transfer is generally accepted by the willing sellers. The willing seller 
continues to control the type, quality and the quantity of land to be available on the market. If the 
state does not meet the conditions of the willing seller in terms of time, the transaction is likely 
to be forfeited.  
 
 
 
 
87 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Published and unpublished documents 
 
African National Congress (ANC). 1955. Freedom Charter. Adopted at the Congress of the 
People, Kliptown, 26 June 1955. 
 
African National Congress (ANC). 1994. Agricultural Policy. Johannesburg: ANC, May 1994.  
 
Aliber, M., and Mokoena, R. 2002. The interaction between the land redistribution programme 
and the land market in South Africa: A perspective on the willing buyer/ willing seller approach. 
Cape Town. Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape. 
(Occasional Paper, no. 21). 
 
Anderson, M., and Pienaar, K. 2003. Municipal Commonage. Evaluating land and agrarian 
reform in South Africa. Cape Town: Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, University of 
the Western Cape. (Occasional, Paper, no. 5). 
 
Andrew, M., Ainslie, A., & Shackleton, C. 2003. Land use and livelihoods. Evaluating Land and 
Agrarian Reform in South Africa Series No 8. Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, 
University of the Western Cape. 
 
Anseeuw, W., and Mathebula, N. 2008. Evaluating land reform’s contribution to South Africa’s 
pro-poor growth pattern. University of Pretoria. TIPS – Annual Forum. 
 
Babbie, E. 2007. The practice of social research. International student edition. 11th ed. 
Wadsworth: Cengage Learning. 
 
Binns, T., and Nel, E. 2002. Supporting Local Economic Development in post-apartheid South 
Africa, Local Economy.  17(1).  
 
 
 
 
 
88 
 
Borras, S. M. 2003. Questioning market-led agrarian reform: Experiences from Brazil, Colombia 
and South Africa. Journal of Agrarian Change, 3(3), pp.367-94. 
 
Bradstock, A. 2005. Key experiences of land reform in the Northern Cape Province of South 
Africa. Policy and Research Series. Farm Africa.  
 
Claassens, A. 2003. Community views on the Communal Land Rights Bill. Programme for Land 
and Agrarian Studies. University of the Western Cape. Research Report No. 15.  
 
Coetzee, G. 2003. ‘Agricultural Finance in South Africa’ in Lieb Nieuwoudt and Jan Groenwald 
(eds.). The challenge of change: agriculture, land and the South African economy. Scottsville: 
University of Natal Press, pp. 225-242.  
 
Coetzee, L., and Jooste, A. 2005. Agricultural land reform: Practical experience with the South 
African Land Redistribution Program (LRAD) in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa. 
Working paper, University of the Free State. 
 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), 2005. Diagnostic study into the 
functioning of communal property associations in land reform in South Africa. Report submitted 
by CSIR Environmentek to DLA Tenure Reform Implementation Systems.  
 
Cousins, B. 2009. SAFM Radio interview. 19 May. 
 
Cousins, B., and Claassens, A. 2003. Looming land disaster. Mail & Guardian, 31 October. 
 
Delport, C.S.L. 2002. Qualitative data collection methods. In De Vos, A.S., Strydom, H., 
Fouche, C.B & Delport, C.S. Research for Grass Roots for the social sciences and human 
service professions. 2nd Edition. Pretoria: J.L. Van Schaik Publishers.   
 
 
 
 
 
89 
 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA). 1997. White Paper on South African Land Policy. Pretoria: 
DLA. 
 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA). 2000. Comments on the broad orientation and scale of the 
land redistribution programme. Directorate: Redistribution Policy and Systems. Pretoria: 
Unpublished paper.  
 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA), 2001. Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development.  
Pretoria: Department of Land Affairs (DLA). 
 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA). 2005. Annual Report.  
 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA). 2006a. Framework on Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy. 
Version 1.  
 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA). 2006b. Annual Report. 
 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA). 2007a. Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy Implementation 
manual. Version 2.  
 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA). 2007b. Lutendo Cooperative Lease contract. Gauteng 
Provincial Land Reform Office, Pretoria. 
 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA). 2007c. Tenehi Close Cooperation Lease contract. Gauteng 
Provincial Land Reform Office, Pretoria. 
 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA). 2007d. Setholoa Lease contract. Gauteng Provincial Land 
Reform Office, Pretoria.  
 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA). 2007e. Annual Report.  
 
 
 
 
90 
 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA). 2008a. West Rand District Screening Committee minutes. 
Gauteng Provincial Land Reform Office, Pretoria. 
 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA). 2008b. Deed of Sale. Gauteng Provincial Land Reform 
Office. Pretoria. 
 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA). 2008c. Annual Report. 
 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA). 2008d. Internal circular. Directive on all future land 
acquisition. Unpublished.   
 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR). 2009a. Annual Report. 
 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR). 2009b. Gauteng Land Reform 
Office Assessment of Proactive Land Acquisition projects report.  
 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR). 2009c. Internal circular. 
 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR). 2010a. Annual Report.     
 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR). 2010b. Minister’s Budget vote 
speech. Cape Town. South Africa.  
 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform. 2010c. Assessment of Gauteng PLAS 
performance. Unpublished.  
 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR). 2011. Annual Report.     
 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR). 2012. Annual Report.     
 
 
 
 
 
91 
 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR). 2013a. Annual Report.     
 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR). 2013b. Speech by the Minister 
of Rural Development and Land Reform, Gugile E Nkwinti, MP, during the tabling of the 
2013/14 Budget Vote in National Assembly. 31 May 2013.   
 
De Villiers, B. 1999. Land claims and national parks – The Makuleke experience. Human 
Sciences Research Council (HSRC Publishers). Pretoria. 
 
De Villiers, B. 2003. Land reform: Issues and challenges. A comparative overview of 
experiences in Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and Australia. Occasional Papers. 
Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Foundation. 
 
De Vos, A.S. 2002. Combined quantitative and qualitative approach. In De Vos, A.S., Strydom, 
H., Fouche, C.B & Delport, C.S. Research for Grass Roots for the social sciences and human 
service professions. 2nd Edition. Pretoria: J.L. Van Schaik Publishers.  
 
Fouche, C.B., and De Vos, A.S. 2002. Qualitative Research Designs. In De Vos, A.S., Strydom, 
H., Fouche, C.B & Delport, C.S. Research for Grass Roots for the social sciences and human 
service professions. 2nd Edition. Pretoria: J.L. Van Schaik Publishers. 
 
Gauteng Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment (GDACE). 2006. Gauteng 
Agricultural Development Strategy. Unpublished.   
 
Gauteng Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment (GDACE). 2007.  Gauteng 
agricultural hubs. Unpublished.  
 
Gilfillan, D. 2001. Poverty alleviation, economic advancement and the need for tenure reform in 
rural areas. SARPN conference on Land Reform and Poverty alleviation in Southern Africa, 
Pretoria. 
 
 
 
 
92 
 
Griffin, K., Azizur, R. K., and Amy, I. 2002. “Poverty and the distribution of land.” Journal of 
Agrarian Change. vol. 2 (3), pp. 279–330. 
 
Grinnel, R.M. 1993. Social work research and evaluation. Itasca IL: Peacock Publishers.   
 
Hall, R. 2004. LRAD rapid systematic assessment survey: nine cases in the Eastern Cape. 
Unpublished Paper. Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape, 
Belleville. 
 
Hall, R. 2008. State, Market and Community: The potential and Limits of Participatory Land 
Reform Planning in South Africa. Programme for Land and agrarian Studies. University of the 
Western Cape. Cape Town. (Working Paper 7). 
 
Hall, R. 2009. Land reform for what? Land use, production and livelihoods. In Hall, R. ed. 
Another Countryside. Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western 
Cape, p.22-59. 
 
Hall, R. 2010a. The Politics of Land Reform in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 1990 -2004: A 
Shifting Terrain of Power, Actors and Discourses. DPhil thesis, University of Oxford.  
 
Hall, R. 2010b. Land Reform how, and for whom? Land demand, targeting and acquisition. In 
Hall, R. ed. Another Countryside. Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, p.62-91.  
 
Hall, R., and Lahiff, E. 2004. Budgeting for Land Reform. Policy Brief No. 13. Cape Town: 
Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape, August. 
 
Jacobs, P., Lahiff, E., and Hall, R. 2003. Land redistribution. Evaluating land and agrarian 
reform in South Africa. Series No 1. Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, University of 
the Western Cape. 
 
 
 
 
 
93 
 
Lahiff, E. 2001. Land reform in South Africa: Is it meeting the challenge? Cape Town: 
Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape. Policy Brief No1.  
 
Lahiff, E. 2005. From willing seller, willing buyer to a people driven land reform. Cape Town. 
Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape. Policy Brief No. 17.   
 
Lahiff, E. 2007a. State, market or the worst of both? Experimenting with market-based land 
reform in South Africa. Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, School of Government, 
University of the Western Cape. Occasional Paper no.30.  
 
Lahiff, E. 2007b. Business models in land reform. Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, 
University of the Western Cape. Research Report No.27. 
 
Lahiff, E., 2008. Land reform in South Africa: A Status Report. Cape Town. University of the 
Western Cape, Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies. Research Report No. 38. 
 
Lahiff, E., Maluleke, T., Manenzhe, T., and Wegerif, M. 2008. Land redistribution and poverty 
reduction in South Africa: The livelihoods impacts of smallholder agriculture under land reform. 
Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape. Research Report 
No. 36. 
 
Lebone, K. 2013. Long term job-loss trends for South African agriculture. South African 
Institute of Race Relations. Press Release.  
 
Lyne, M. & Darroch, M. 2004. Land redistribution in KwaZulu, South Africa: Four census 
surveys of farmland transactions, 1997-2000. Madison:  University of Wisconsin-Madison.  
 
Marcus, T. 1996. “Farm workers and labour tenants.” Land and Agricultural Policy Centre, 
Indicator Press, Natal. 
 
 
 
 
 
94 
 
Manenzhe, T. J. 2007. Post settlement challenges for land reform beneficiaries: three case studies 
from Limpopo Province. MPhil thesis, Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies. University of 
the Western Cape.  
 
Mayson, D. 2002. Agrarian reform and agricultural co-operatives in Cuba –some lessons for 
South Africa. Available at:  http://www.spp.org.za/publications/agrarian-reforms.pdf. 
 
Mayson, D. 2003. Joint ventures. Evaluating Land and Agrarian Reform in South Africa Series. 
No.7. Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape.   
 
McMillan, D. E., Painter, T., and Scudder, T. 1992. Settlement and development in the river 
Blindness control zone. World Bank Technological Paper No. 192. Series on River Blindness 
Control in West Africa. World Bank, Washington DC.  
 
Mellor, J. W. 1999. Pro-poor growth: The relation between agricultural growth and poverty 
reduction. Unpublished document. 
 
Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs (MALA). 1998. Agricultural Policy in South Africa. 
Discussion document. Pretoria: MALA.   
 
Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs (MALA). 2003. Review of the Land Redistribution for 
Agricultural Programme. Unpublished report.   
 
Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs (MALA). 2005. The AgriBEE Indaba Speech by Ms 
Thoko Didiza, Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs.  Pretoria: MALA, 6 December 2005. 
 
National Land Committee (NLC). 1995. Land Reform Policy Proposals. Johannesburg: NLC. 
 
National Treasury, 2012. Budget Estimates of National Expenditure. Vote 33. Rural 
Development and Land Reform. 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
Neuman, W.L., 2003. Social research methods: qualitative and quantitative approaches. 5th 
ed. Boston et. al.: Pearsons Education Inc. 
 
Pienaar, K. 2009. South African land reform at a crossroad: Securing the land rights of poor 
people. First International Academic Partnership for Environment and Development in Africa 
(APEDIA), Conference on Sustainable Land Use in Africa.  
 
Platzky, L., and Walker, C. 1985. The surplus people: forced removals in South Africa. 
Johannesburg: Ravan Press. 
 
Posterman, R., and Reidinger, J., 1987. Land reform and democratic development. Baltimore 
and London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Republic of South Africa (RSA). 1995. White Paper on Agriculture. Pretoria: Department of 
Agriculture. Available at: http://www.nda.agric.za/docs/Policy/WHITEPAPER.htm. 
 
Republic of South Africa (RSA). 1996. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, No. 8 of 
1996. Pretoria: Government Printers. 
 
Segal, L. 1991. A brutal harvest: the roots and legitimization of violence on farms in South 
Africa. Project for the Study of Violence, The Black Sash. 
 
Sparks, A. 2004. Rulers selling out the rural poor. The Star, 24 February. 
 
Steward, T. 2009. Service-learning and honours undergraduates: the effect on social dominance 
orientation. Journal of the First-Year Experience and Students in Transition, Vol. 21, pp 65-86. 
University of Central Florida. 
 
 
 
 
 
96 
 
Strydom, H., and Venter, L. 2002. Sampling and sampling methods. In De Vos, A.S., Strydom, 
H., Fouche, C.B & Delport, C.S. Research for Grass Roots for the social sciences and human 
service professions. 2nd Edition. Pretoria: J.L. Van Schaik Publishers.   
 
Tilley, S. 2004. Why do the landless remain landless? An examination of land acquisition and 
the extent to which the land market and land redistribution mechanisms serve the needs of land 
seeking people. Cape Town: Surplus People Project.  
 
Turner, S., and Ibsen, H. 2000. Land and agrarian reform in South Africa: A status report. 
Research Report No. 6. Cape Town: Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies; University of 
the Western Cape. 
 
Van den Brink, R., Thomas, G., Bingswanger, H., Bruce, J., and Byamugisha. T. 2006. 
Consensus, Confusion, and Controversy: Selected Land Reform issues in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
World Bank Working Paper No. 71. Washington DC: World Bank.   
 
Van Zyl, J., & Binswanger, H. 1996. Market-assisted rural land reform: how will it work in 
agricultural land reform in South Africa: Policies, markets and mechanisms? Cape Town: Oxford 
University Press.   
 
Wachter, F. 2010. An investigation of the South African Land Reform process, from a conflict 
resolution perspective. MPhil thesis. Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University. 
 
Wegerif, M., 2004. A critical appraisal of South Africa's market-based land reform policy: the 
case of the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme in Limpopo.  
Cape Town: Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, School of Government, University of 
the Western Cape. Research Report No. 19. 
 
 
 
 
 
97 
 
Wilson, F., and Ramphele, M. 1989. Uprooting poverty: The South African challenge. Report for 
the Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in Southern Africa. Cape Town: 
David Philip. 
 
World Bank. 2003. Land policies for growth and poverty reduction. Washington D.C.: World 
Bank and Oxford University Press. 
 
 
 
 
98 
 
 
 
Interviews and personal communications 
 
Daba, S. Land Reform Beneficiary, Lutendo Cooperative Project, West Rand District, Mogale 
City Municipality, June 2010a in Randfontein. 
 
Daba, E. Land Reform Beneficiary, Lutendo Cooperative Project, West Rand District, Mogale 
City Municipality, June 2010b in Randfontein. 
 
Keameditse, D. Project Coordinator: West Rand District. Department of Rural Development and 
Land Reform, Provincial Shared Services Centre: Gauteng, Pretoria, interview, October 2013 in 
Pretoria. 
 
Mahlangu, S. Director: Land Reform, Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, 
Provincial Shared Services Centre: Gauteng, Pretoria, interview, October 2013 in Pretoria. 
 
Maimane, M. Rural Development Coordinator, Mogale City Municipality, West Rand District, 
interview May 2011 in Krugersdorp.   
 
Maleswene, N. Deputy Director: Land Reform, West Rand District Manager, Department of 
Rural Development and Land Reform, Gauteng Provincial Shared Services Centre, interview, in 
September 2012 in Pretoria. 
 
Mamphodo, A. Deputy Director, Agricultural Economist, Department of Rural Development and 
Land Reform, Provincial Shared Services Centre: Gauteng, Pretoria, interview, May 2011in 
Pretoria. 
 
 
 
 
 
99 
 
Manaka, M. Former Director: Land Reform, Department of Rural Development and Land 
Reform, Provincial Shared Services Centre: Gauteng, Pretoria, interview, March 2011 in 
Pretoria. 
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Development, West Rand District, September 2010 in Randfontein and Tarlton. 
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Municipality, June 2010a in Tarlton Area.  
 
Tenehi, B. Land Reform Beneficiary, Tenehi Project, West Rand District, Mogale City 
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APPENDIX A 
Questionnaire directed to the beneficiaries of the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS) for 
the purpose of research on “The potential and limits of the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy 
(PLAS): Land Reform implementation in Gauteng Province of South Africa” 
 
Introduction 
Good morning/ afternoon/ evening. I am Ndivhuho Ranwedzi, a student at the University of the Western 
Cape conducting a study on the potential and limits of the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy for my 
Masters Degree in Land and Agrarian Studies. I would like to hear from beneficiaries of PLAS regarding 
their experiences, knowledge, constraints, and opportunities on the PLAS model of land reform. 
 
Your answers are very important to both of us because they will help us to identify areas of intervention.  
 
This interview is confidential, and no names will be taken to associate anyone with a particular question 
and/or answer. All information gathered through this exercise will only be used for the purpose of this 
study.    
Though your responses are considered important, you are not compelled to respond if you choose 
not to.  
  
Do you agree to be interviewed? 
1. YES 
2. NO 
 
Place:____________________________ 
Date: ____________________________ 
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Research questions 
Project name:  
Purchase price:  
Number of beneficiaries: 
Extent of the land:  
Period of occupation:   
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA 
Beneficiaries  Age  Education  Income  Source of income  Position at 
household  
A      
B      
C      
D      
E      
F      
G      
H      
I      
J      
Age: 1. (<20); 2. (20-35); 3. (36-45); 4. (45-60); 5. (>60) 
Education:     1. (never); 2. (Grade 1-7); 3. (Grade 8-12); 4. (Tertiary qualification); 5. 
(Postgraduate) 
Monthly income: 1. (<R500); 2. (R501-R1000); 3. (R1001 –R2000); 4. (R2001 –R3000); 5. (>R3000) 
Source of income: 1. (Formal job); 2. (Business); 3. (Pension); 4. (Informal job), 5. (Other- specify)   
Position at Household: 1. (Father/Mother); 2. (Dependant); 3. (Grandparent); 4. (Uncle/Aunt); 5. 
(Other-specify)    
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BASIC SERVICES  
Beneficiaries  Water source  Sanitation  Energy source  Shelter  
A     
B     
C     
D     
E     
F     
G     
H     
I     
J     
 Water: 1. (Municipal); 2. (Borehole); 3. (River/stream); 4. (Tanker); 5. (Other-specify) 
Sanitation: 1. (Inside house); 2. (Outside house); 3. (Pit); 4. (Mobile); 5. (Other-specify)   
Energy source: 1. (Electricity); 2. (Gas); 3. (Solar); 4. (Paraffin) ; 5. (Other-specify) 
Shelter: 1. (Suburb); 2. (Township); 3. (RDP); 4. (Informal settlement); 5. (Other-specify)  
 
BENEFICIARY SELECTION PROCESSES  
How did you come together as a 
group? If alone, how and why 
did you decide to do it alone? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Who started the project?  
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2. Did you know each other 
before you joined the project? If 
yes, how did you meet 
 
3. How long did you know each 
other and how did you know each 
other?  
 
4. Are there members who did not 
know one another before they 
joined the project? 
 
5. Is there anyone who is involved 
in any socio-economic, political, 
religious, etc. activity with any 
member of the project? If yes, 
how long have you been doing it, 
and how often do you engage 
each other on such activities? 
 
6. Which other activities do you 
do together as a group except this 
project?  
 
 
LAND IDENTIFICATION PROCESS 
Explain the manner in which 
you identified the property 
 
 
 
 
7. Who identified the land?  
8. How did you identify the land?  
9. How long did it take you to 
identify this farm?   
 
10. How long have you been 
looking for a farm? 
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11. Who helped you to identify 
the land? 
 
 
LAND ACQUISITION PROCESS  
Explain how you knew about 
land reform and how you 
followed the process until you 
accessed this property 
 
 
 
12. In which institution did you 
lodge your application? 
 
13. In which area was the 
application lodged? 
 
14. Were you involved with the 
process of acquisition? 
 
15. How were you involved?  
16. To what extent were you 
involved in the price negotiation? 
 
17. What efforts did you do to get 
the property transferred?  
 
18. What costs did you incur 
during acquisition?  
 
19. How much was the cost?  
20. How did you recover such 
costs?  
 
 
PROJECT OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT   
Explain how you managed the 
project to date? Who was 
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responsible for what? 
 
 
21. Do you have a 
management/leadership structure? 
If yes, state the structure 
(organogram). 
 
22. How was it formed?   
23. What consideration did you 
make when allocating members to 
positions? 
 
24. What is the involvement of 
project members in the daily 
activities of the project?  
 
25. What position does each 
member occupy?  
 
26. What production skills does 
each member possess?  
 
27. What business administrative 
skills does each member possess?   
 
28. What are your short term, 
medium term and long term 
goals?  
 
29. How do you cover your 
administrative costs? 
 
30. How much was the property 
purchased for? 
 
31. How much is your annual 
rental? 
 
32. How do you cover your 
rental? 
 
33. Do you have any additional  
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source of income?  
 
LAND USE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT  
Explain how you made 
production ever since you 
occupied the farm. What was 
produced and to what scale? 
What informed these 
commodities?  
 
34. What is the extent of this 
land? 
 
35. What was the previous land 
used for before you occupied the 
farm?  
 
36. What is the current land use?  
37. Is your land divided for 
different land use? If yes, how is 
it divided and for which 
commodities?  
 
38. Did you change the land use 
and commodities? If yes, why did 
you change? If no, why didn’t you 
change? 
 
39. Do you have any land use and 
development plan? If yes, how 
was it developed? If no, what 
informs your continuous  
productions? 
 
40. How often do your refer to 
and or comply with these plans? 
 
41. What is your main produce?   
42. How do you determine what 
to produce? 
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43. Have you signed a lease 
contract with the Department? If 
yes, when was it signed and for 
how long will you be using the 
property?  
 
44. How much have you spent in 
servicing the lease contract and 
where did you get funds from? 
 
45. When it expires, are you 
intending to renew it? If yes, has 
the Department contacted you 
about renewal? 
 
46. If you were to renew the 
contract, what would you like to 
see changed/ amended on the 
contract?  
 
 
SUPPORT SERVICES  
Training  
47. Have you received any 
training before, during or after 
occupation of the farm? 
 
48. If yes, what type of training 
and for how long? 
 
49. Is any member affiliated with 
any study group and or 
commodity group?  
 
 
Marketing  
50. Where do you market your 
produce?  
 
51. Do you have any contracts 
with your market? 
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52. How do you market your 
products? 
 
53. How do you relate to your 
market? 
 
54. What do you do with the 
surplus? 
 
 
Stakeholders 
55. Which institutions normally 
provide you with support, and 
how often do you receive such 
support? 
 
56. What type of support do you 
receive from those stakeholders?   
 
 
Infrastructure   
Explain what infrastructural 
investment did you make to the 
property ever since your 
occupation 
 
57. Which infrastructure did you 
develop after occupation? 
 
58. How much did it cost?  
59. What was the source of 
funding?  
 
60. How do you maintain such 
infrastructure? 
 
61. What is the source of 
maintenance?  
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Mechanization   
Explain how you provided 
mechanization for your 
production  
 
62. What equipment/ implements 
did you bring to the project? 
 
63. What equipment did you find 
in the property, and what was the 
condition of such equipment? 
 
64. What equipment did you 
purchase after occupation? 
 
65. How much did it cost?  
66. What was the source of 
funding?  
 
67. How do you maintain such 
equipment? 
 
68. What is the source of 
maintenance?  
 
 
Production inputs 
Explain how you provided 
inputs for your productions  
 
 
69. What are your major inputs?  
70. Where do you collect such 
inputs? 
 
71. What is the distance between 
the farm and the supplier? 
 
72. How often do you require 
such inputs? 
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73. What is your monthly cost for 
the inputs? 
 
74. Where do you get resources 
for your inputs?  
 
 
Extension services 
Explain your relationship with 
the Extension Officers and how 
you access their services 
 
75. Do you receive any extension 
services? If yes, how often do you 
receive such services? 
 
76. What type of information do 
you receive from the extension 
officers? 
 
77. Where do get the information 
that the extension officer is not 
providing? 
 
78. Do you find the information 
from the extension officers 
helpful? 
 
  
State any other information you would like to share with the Researcher regarding your project: 
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________      ____________________ 
Signature of Enumerator      Date  
 
 
 
 
